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From small countries’ perspectives, the four general defensive postures—conventional 
military build-ups, WMD acquisition, alliance formation, and neutrality—are not always 
viable choices, and are often unaffordable. So these countries must seek more effective 
and less expensive solutions. From more powerful countries’ perspectives, there is 
something to be changed, too, since the conflicts of the last few decades have indicated 
that conventionally waged wars against contemporary opponents have often led to failure.  
Given that ongoing conflicts differ from classical conventional warfare, two 
major questions arise: (1) Is irregular warfare still really irregular, or has it now replaced 
conventional warfare and become “regular”? (2) Is it wise to consider a professional 
irregular warfighting capability in defense strategy? Recent research proved the 
effectiveness of irregular warfare, and concluded that a combination of one of the general 
conventional models with irregular warfare techniques is desirable.  
Through analysis of the major dominant irregular leaders’ ideologies and their 
theories, and the case studies of three recent irregular wars, this research was conducted 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION ...............................................................................2 
C. DESIGN FRAMEWORK ...............................................................................2 
D. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................4 
II. MODERN IRREGULAR WARFARE ......................................................................7 
A. AIMS AND GOALS OF MODERN IW ......................................................12 
B. WHY IW? .......................................................................................................12 
C. HOW CAN IW FIT INTO A DEFENSE STRATEGY? ............................13 
III. CONDITIONS FOR WAGING IRREGULAR WARFARE .................................15 
A. STRATEGY AND TACTICS .......................................................................15 
B. GEOGRAPHY ...............................................................................................19 
C. HUMAN NATURE THAT IS DESIGNED FOR IW .................................23 
D. FINANCIAL LIMITATIONS AND FINANCIAL ADVANTAGES ........27 
IV. THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON IN 2006 .............................................31 
A. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................31 
B. STRATEGY AND TACTICS .......................................................................33 
C. GEOGRAPHY ...............................................................................................35 
D. HUMAN FACTOR ........................................................................................37 
E. FINANCIAL FACTOR .................................................................................39 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................41 
V. THE ETHIOPIAN INVASION OF SOMALIA IN 2006 .......................................43 
A. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................43 
B. STRATEGY AND TACTICS .......................................................................44 
C. GEOGRAPHY ...............................................................................................46 
D. HUMAN FACTOR ........................................................................................48 
E. FINANCIAL FACTORS ...............................................................................49 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................51 
VI. THE U.S. INVASION OF IRAQ IN 2003................................................................53 
A. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................53 
1. The Sunni Insurgency ........................................................................55 
2. Al-Qaeda in Iraq ................................................................................57 
B. STRATEGY AND TACTICS .......................................................................59 
C. GEOGRAPHY ...............................................................................................61 
D. HUMAN FACTORS ......................................................................................62 
E. FINANCIAL FACTORS ...............................................................................64 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................66 
VII. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................69 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................73 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................77 
 vii 





During recent decades, more and more studies have argued the effectiveness of 
irregular warfare. Arreguín-Toft’s research into the armed conflicts between 1800 and 
1998 suggests that the weaker side was defeated 70 percent of the time. The number of 
victories achieved by the weaker side, however, has been increasing. Between the years 
of 1950 and 1998, the weaker side won 55 percent of the time. In those cases when the 
stronger side applied conventional strategy against the weaker side that primarily used an 
indirect approach, the rate of victory was 64 percent for the weaker side.1 What 
alternative choices could these small countries possibly have? Existing literature2 
suggests four general options for smaller countries.  
The first approach is simply pretending or trying to have a formidable 
conventional army and convincing the population that they are safe. A second method is 
to join an alliance and rely on collective-security. Though history shows cases where 
expected support did not materialize. This does not mean that an effective irregular 
defense strategy has to be excluded from the pillars that an alliance is built upon. 
A third path a small country can take is to shield itself with (the reality or the 
threat) of weapons of mass destruction. While weapons of mass destruction can be an 
effective tool of deterrence, they can be extremely expensive. In addition, many countries 
signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty after the end of the Cold War, and since then the 
international community has paid especially close attention to containing the spread of 
these weapons.  
A fourth approach is neutrality. A declared policy of neutrality can be and often is 
an effective way to maintain control over one’s borders. It can fail quickly and painfully, 
however, when ignored by a stronger power.  
1 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, ed., How the Weak Win Wars: The Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 106. 
2 Sandor Fabian, “Professional Irregular Defense Forces: The Other Side of COIN” (Monterey, 
California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 19–24. 
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These methods share several built-in pitfalls for small countries: unsustainable 
costs, unreliable security commitments, and precarious international agreements. Even 
though many researchers found that a professional guerilla force can overcome these 
obstacles, the conditions under which a small nation can effectively integrate IDS into its 
defense policy have been poorly determined.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to investigate this issue further. The research question thus 
becomes clear: Under what conditions is irregular warfare an effective form of national 
defense? 
C. DESIGN FRAMEWORK 
Most countries have had conventional defense strategies for centuries. It is hard to 
change from a strategy that has been in place for a long time. Considering the differences 
among countries concerning their military capabilities, it is clear that in case of invasion, 
many small states will not be able to resist by means of conventional warfare. Even 
though irregular warfare is as old as man and has been present in most conflicts since the 
beginning of war, it has seldom been considered a state-level military strategy to win a 
war. The purpose of this thesis is to study a possibly more effective defense strategy 
option—the Irregular Defense Strategy (IDS)—for those small countries that are having 
difficulties in sustaining larger armed forces. In detail, this thesis will explore when IDS 
is an effective strategic option and then explore how IDS is best employed by a weaker 
country against a more powerful aggressor. History shows that the conventional defense 
strategies have not always been the most effective way to defend a small country.  
The primary scope of this research is to define the kind of characteristics of 
irregular warfare most pertinent to innovative national defense strategies. John Arquilla 
states, “…the RMA [revolution in military affairs] may provide a world of opportunity 
for the irregularization of warfare—an opportunity we ignore at our increasing peril.”3 
One also has to consider the wide possibilities given by the Internet. T. E. Lawrence 
3 John Arquilla, “The Confederacy Could Have Won—Unconventionally: A Thought Experiment for 
Special Warriors,” Special Warfare (January, 2001): 16. 
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famously said, “The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern 
commander.”4 Even in that time, when the communication assets were far less effective, 
the media played a great role. Thinking about the twenty-first century, this can assist even 
more a successful irregular campaign.  
This thesis will also consider the geographical conditions those best or least 
support guerilla-type armed activities. One of the most important characteristic can be the 
advantageous use of the terrain and the effective use of the element of surprise. In 
addition, this thesis will examine the cost of the war from both the aggressor’s and 
defender’s perspectives. In all countries, defense strategy heavily relies on resources. The 
smaller your country is, the more difficult it is to sustain a conventional army with the 
appropriate effect within an international conflict environment. Max Boot argues for IDS, 
“It is not hard to see why this mode of warfare has become so prevalent. For one thing, it 
is cheap and easy….”5 Lastly, the human factor will be considered. Many nations simply 
are not designed for conventional warfare. For example, back in the ancient ages 
Hungarians were rarely defeated while using irregular tactics, but lost uncountable battles 
while conventionalized. In a similar vein, tremendous effort has been put into building a 
conventional army in Afghanistan (around 300,000 armed personnel), which may 
nonetheless prove ineffective due to lack of motivation of its member; in that same 
country, however, some tribal men armed with simple weapons and unshakable resolve 
have time and again made the struggle extremely costly for the allies, both in human and 
financial resources.   
Hypotheses 1: A beneficial use of the geographical environment coupled with a 
doctrine based on irregular strategy is more likely to achieve an effective defense for a 
small country.  
Hypotheses 2: Under certain circumstances, a professional irregular defense 
strategy can be less costly for a small country than any of the four general alternatives. 
4 Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present 
(New York: Liveright, 2013), 567. 
5  Boot, Invisible Armies, xx. 
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D. METHODOLOGY 
In order to examine the proposed hypotheses, this thesis will employ a heuristic 
framework to explore and distill the conditions under which IDS might provide an 
effective form of national defense. This framework will be predicated upon the 
assumption that some small nations are not able to sustain a large conventional army. The 
first part of this thesis will focus on the possible conditions for effective IDS that need to 
be considered by the state in order to reorganize or establish a new strategy. The main 
body of the research will be based on the following books and arguments: Max Boot’s 
Twelve Articles,6 or the Lessons of Five Thousand Years, Von der Heydte’s Modern 
Irregular Warfare,7 Otto Heilbrunn’s Partisan Warfare,8 James Kiras’s Irregular 
Warfare,9 Derek Leebaert’s To Dare and Conquer,10 and John Arquilla’s Insurgents, 
Raiders, and Bandits.11 
In the second part, this thesis will examine three modern historical cases of 
irregular warfighting based on the congruence method. The first case is the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in 2006. The expectation is to observe the effective use of low-
budget weapon systems by Hezbollah, the advantageous use of terrain, and the 
organizational factor in order to determine the degree to which the strategy and 
geographical placement of battle affect irregular warfare. The second case is the invasion 
of Somalia by Ethiopia in 2006. Considering that Somali forces lacked conventional 
forces and did not have state-level allies or WMD, this case can provide a valuable base 
to research the conditions and test the theory given by the hypotheses. The third case is 
the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and its allies in 2003. This was a properly implemented 
6 Boot, Invisible Armies, 557. 
7 Friedrich von der Heydte, ed., Modern Irregular Warfare,in Defense Policy and as a Military 
Phenomenon., trans. George Gregory (New York: Franklin House, 1986). 
8 Otto Heilbrunn, ed., Partisan Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1962). 
9 James D. Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” in Understanding Modern Warfare (Cambridge: University 
Press, 2008). 
10 Derek Leebaert, ed., To Dare and to Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations from 
Achilles to Al-Qaeda Brown and Company, 2006). 
11 John Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare have Shaped 
our World (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2011). 
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conventional military invasion and yet, after the invasion, the military occupation 
experienced a prolonged insurgency that ultimately led to the conclusion to withdraw 
from the occupied territory.  
In all cases, irregular forces played significant roles in the resistance, and the 
expectation is to determine how human nature is related to the conduct of irregular 
warfare. This part of the thesis will conclude by analyzing what is more and what is less 
important to consider while building a defense strategy. 
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II. MODERN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
In the military realm, “Irregular Warfare” is an increasingly known and studied 
term, since regular warfare is “disappearing.” In its classic form—when divisions of 
armored vehicles supported by aircraft that are able to fly low and high or slow and fast 
face each other—conventional warfare is not expected to be the common form of battle in 
the near future. Submarines and aircraft carriers cruise the globe continuously to deter or 
prevent conventional conflict from happening.  
Recently, information technology has evolved so much that its own creators have 
difficulties with controlling its capability. Satellites can look into backyards, and almost 
every square meter of the Earth is covered by them. These tools are part of what a general 
or other military leader would demand to successfully wage a regular conflict. The 
dominant powers of the world possess these capabilities making the conduct of 
conventional warfare more costly. Therefore, one can see why contemporary clashes tend 
to avoid the regular way to fight battles. 
There are several reasons why conventional war is on the wane. One can be the 
fact that most of these powerful countries are democratic or in a position to become so 
and they try to solve their problems in a more diplomatic way. Another reason could be 
that deterrence works properly in those superpowers’ geopolitics. As von der Heydte 
argues, however, the most possible course of action is that the opponents do not want to 
expose themselves against such an overwhelming dominance: “In view of the superiority 
of regular forces, which cannot be compensated for, against civilian insurgents who do 
not have larger troop units on their side, such insurgents today...no longer have a real 
chance to achieve their aim in open combat.”12 So, the question is inevitable: How will 
be the conflicts be waged in the future? It is hard to answer in a simple sentence, but the 
truth can be found in John Arquilla’s argument that, “The twenty-first century already 
12 Von der Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, 21. 
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shows clear signs that it will be a time replete with, if not dominated by, irregular 
warfare.”13 
Regardless of the demonstrated regular military prowess in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the Coalition forces led by the United States were unable to effectively or efficiently 
counter the threats that arose in these countries after the ruling regimes were overthrown. 
In his excellent study of irregular warfare, James D. Kiras observes: “The perceived 
failure of Coalition forces…to come to grips with irregular threats, which have been 
characterized as terrorism, insurgency, sectarian violence and civil war…”14 The more 
often capable countries use their modern militaries, and the more often they fail to 
achieve decisive results, the larger the chance is to lose local popular or international 
support for the conflict.  
The United States and its allies are not alone in this frustrating suffering against 
irregular treats. Israel has had many problems in fighting against Hezbollah using 
conventional means and has been exposed to serious losses on land, in the air, and even at 
sea. Kiras argues that these are potential indicators of a new type of warfare: “The 
campaign in the summer of 2006 in Lebanon…is proof positive to 4GW (Fourth 
Generation Warfare) supporters that the clash of conventional armies is increasingly 
becoming an anachronism.”15 
This does not necessarily mean that the time of large conventional forces is 
entirely over, but surely it means that something has recently changed, and the dominant 
way to wage wars in the future will be something else. In his recent book, John Arquilla 
argues the improper use of the generational concept, since history shows different 
experiments: “Better to think in terms of conventional and irregular warfare always 
coexisting, sometimes quite uneasily, with one or the other ascendant in different eras.”16 
13 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 12. 
14 Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 227. 
15 Ibid., 228. 
16 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 8. 
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If one researches the contemporary literature about irregular warfare, it can be 
found that several definitions try to give us the clearest picture of this phenomenon. 
According to Kiras (the owner of the ‘Educator of the Year’ award for 2006–7), irregular 
warfare is, “…the use of violence by sub-state actors or groups within states for political 
purposes of achieving power, control and legitimacy, using unorthodox or 
unconventional approaches to warfare owing to a fundamental weakness in resources or 
capabilities.”17 As cited in Kiras’s “Irregular Warfare,” the Joint Staff publication 
approaches from a slightly different direction including an extremely important factor—
the population—but fundamentally states the meaning of IW similarly: “A violent 
struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 
population. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full 
range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, 
and will.”18 
W.E.D. Allen, a compatriot of LTC Orde Wingate in the Abyssinian battles, 
wrote his notes and definition about IW during World War II. His definition is also 
similar to the contemporary ones: “The term ‘irregular warfare’ is only one of many 
coined to describe conflict between those fielding conventional forces and capabilities 
against an opponent who refuses battle, uses hit-and-run tactics and even targets non-
combatants indiscriminately in order to achieve their objectives.”19  
IW is too complex to properly define it in a few sentences and these definitions 
give us only a broad picture of IW. Based on John Arquilla’s insights in his Insurgents, 
Raiders, and Bandits, a couple of significant discrepancies can be found in all the 
definitions. First, they do not identify what side (weak or strong) can resort to one of the 
types of IW. Second, they do not answer the question whether standing military forces 
should employ IW in a conflict? The above-cited definitions give some generic ideas 
about how it is that the weak are the ones who usually fight irregularly, the target usually 
17 Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 232. 
18 Ibid., 233. 
19 W. E. D. Allen, Guerrilla War in Abyssinia (New York: Penguin, 1943), 18. 
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is the military or the population itself, and the short range objective is the legitimacy and 
control over the population.  
In order to merge these definitions into a much more compact explanation, one 
needs to add Friedrich August von der Heydte’s notion about IW. He not only includes 
the small action groups as the best fit to wage irregular warfare “…in which the parties 
are not large units, but small and very small action groups…” (as cited20) but also 
describes the main method as an attritional struggle in which “…the outcome is not 
decided in a few large battles, but the decision is sought, and ultimately achieved, in a 
very large number of small, individual operations, robberies, acts of terrorism and 
sabotage, bombings and other attacks” (as cited21). In order to understand how these can 
fit into the defense strategy, one needs more detailed understanding of the characteristics 
of irregular warfare. The following paragraphs will identify the types of IW, aims and 
goals of modern IW, why the weak prefer to wage IW instead of going into open 
combats, and finally how it can fit into a defense strategy. 
From the wide variety of choices to determine the types of IW, Kiras 
distinguished five main categories.22 The first is coup d’état, which focuses on the 
overthrow of the government, if possible with little bloodshed and with secrecy as an 
extremely important factor; the main goal is to change national policies or ethnic or 
religious exclusion. The second is terrorism, which targets everything that is associated 
with the government (population, military, police, buildings, etc.), using their severely 
limited resources to spread fear (often broadcast by media outlets); terrorists seek to 
convince adversary audiences that the risks and prizes of a conflict are not worth the 
current and potential future cost.  
The third is revolution. Similar to the coup d’état, revolution focuses on the 
overthrow of the government. It has two key factors: the organizers and an oppressed and 
dissatisfied population. The organizers agitate against the government and raise the 
20 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 8. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 232. 
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consciousness of the oppressed. When the time is appropriate, a critical mass of the 
population will overpower the security elements of the regime and allow the ‘organizers’ 
to assume power.  
The fourth of Kiras’s five categories is civil war. Here, the struggle is between 
competing factions within identifiable territories to gain control and recognition in order 
to become legitimate for governing a state. The fifth category is insurgency. It shares 
some characteristics of the other types of IW. Educating, organizing, and proselytizing 
the population against the existing regime or developing a ‘shadow government’ are key 
factors.  
There is a distinct difference, however, between insurgency and revolution. 
Insurgents may intimidate, coerce, or terrorize the population in order to gain support. 
They also recruit from the local population and persuade residents that the government is 
not able to govern their territory and it is much better to support the insurgency either 
passively or actively. This form of IW might be the most flexible one, since the territorial 
defeat of its forces does not necessarily mean the war is over. Members are merged into 
the population, and even if the regime is thought stable, these members can cause serious 
damage, so the threat of the insurgents remains. This contradicts von der Heydte’s 
argument that revolution and civil war are not categories of IW, but IW is an instrument 
of how these conflicts are waged: “Irregular war—also in the form of civil war—is not 
itself a revolution, but at most an instrument and, under certain circumstances, part of a 
revolution”23 or “[i]f none of the rules modeled on the ‘conventions’ of international law 
emerge in civil war, rules which limit the employment of violence to certain persons and 
instruments, then such a civil war will take on the form of irregular warfare.”24 Despite 
the fact that IW can be categorized into different forms or named as an instrument of a 
war, the main point is that when a group or organization chooses to adopt irregular 
warfare it might lack other capabilities such as conventional resources, nuclear assets, or 
simply financial support and is, therefore, unable to maintain a larger and more powerful 
military.  
23 Von der Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, 15. 
24 Ibid., 20. 
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A. AIMS AND GOALS OF MODERN IW  
When IW is chosen as an instrument of indirect action, the primary effect is 
psychological rather than physical. The main intent is to “outmaneuver” the adversary, 
not to beat them “decisively.” Von der Heydte says, “Anyone choosing to employ 
irregular warfare…His aim will be to make his own political aim appear as historically 
necessary, inevitable, and self-evident to his adversary.”25 It is obvious that, even if one 
takes the terrain of the others or conquers all the decisive points, the war itself has not 
been necessarily won. History can provide numerous examples in which the final defeat 
of the enemy had not been accomplished until his will was broken. T. E. Lawrence did 
not support the decisive battle either. His strategic aim was to “…seek its [the Turkish 
army’s] weakest link, and bear only on that till time made the mass of it fall. The Arab 
army must impose the longest possible passive defense on the Turks…by extending its 
own front to the maximum.”26 
B. WHY IW?  
Many groups, people or organizations that choose to wage irregular warfare rarely 
do so because this potentially dangerous lifestyle is attractive to them. To avoid 
unnecessary prolonged struggle, leaders of insurgency would prefer to have more 
sophisticated conventional arsenals, even nuclear resources. Kiras argues that, “Most 
groups adopt IW because other, more decisive, forms of political violence are unavailable 
to them.”27  
Von der Heydte sees it from a different perspective. His view originates from the 
modern weapon system era, in which insurgencies have difficulties not only to gain or 
possess heavy weapon systems (i.e., tanks or aircraft), but also to train and use them 
especially when the considerable part of the armed forces have no common cause with 
the insurgents. Von der Heydte concludes that, “[i]n view of the superiority of regular 
25 Von der Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, 38. 
26 T. E. Lawrence, “Science of Guerrilla Warfare,” in Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed. (Edinburgh: 
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1929), 248. 
27 Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 232. 
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forces, which cannot be compensated for, against civilian insurgents who do not have 
larger troop units on their side, such insurgents today, despite their courage and 
willingness to sacrifice, no longer have a real chance to achieve their aim in open combat. 
The only way to success which still offers itself in such a case is irregular warfare.”28 
C. HOW CAN IW FIT INTO A DEFENSE STRATEGY? 
After World War I, modern international law superseded classical international 
law. One of the two exceptions to the prohibition of the employment of armed forces was 
the war of self-defense in which a state that has been the victim of an unprovoked 
invasion or attack wages a war in order to defend its sovereignty. Most likely, a weak 
state that is attacked by a much more powerful adversary will be able to fight against the 
invader by only irregular means. Under certain circumstances, this warfighting becomes 
“allowed;” the actions and tactics used during the struggle, however, are confusing and 
only partially covered by the rules of engagement.29 International law and strategy are co-
dependent. With this “legitimate” international viewpoint, a small state can purposefully 
plan an irregular pillar in its defense strategy.  
Von der Heydte argues that, “Military strategy is not necessarily a strategy of war. 
The real art of a military strategy is to achieve the political aim sought for without war—
by means of the mere demonstration of military power.”30 Obviously, this strategy will 
not deter a strong adversary but it could menace the invader in time and space like 
Yugoslavia demonstrated its “irregular” capability in 1971.31  
Yugoslavia wanted to deter Soviet political threats or invasion with a clear 
statement that an occupation would have serious consequences and the effort would have 
extremely high cost; it also would be bloody and prolonged. Their new doctrine—total 
national defense—consisted of three main pillars. The conventional forces would mount a 
defense to slow the enemy’s ground, waterborne, and airborne movements and then 
28 Von der Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, 21. 
29 Ibid., 31. 
30 Ibid., 37. 
31 Ibid. 
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withdraw to avoid frontal battles. The enemy then would be flanked and attacked from 
the rear by irregular and territorial defense forces. Finally, the occupying force would 
face a total resistance of the local population. Even though it was not a pure military 
deterrence, it had a similar function.32 
There has never been a guerrilla-type war waged when the guerrillas were 
superior to their adversaries; rather, they have always been outnumbered on a great scale. 
Furthermore, they have rarely been purposefully and professionally better trained than 
their conventional opponents. Guerrilla warfare can benefit more from small trained elite 
formations than from massive maneuvers. The last few decades turned this warfare into a 
highly specialized art of war; hence, military planners can do well to prepare for small or 
limited war in advance.  
Guerrillas and special units have common approaches to wageing war, such as 
demolitions, destruction, and back-alley ambushes often dressed in indistinguishable 
clothes from the local population.33 They also have specially skilled men like the half-
naked Viet Cong slipping through dense barbed wire equipped with explosives to 
eliminate command posts, or Palestinian shooters sniping at Israeli cabinet members; 
these are not, however, the reasons for their success. Derek Leebaert summarizes how 
guerrilla forces and special operations forces can be related, and how military planners 
might start thinking about guerrilla actions as a more effective way of a defense: 
The special operation melds into guerrilla warfare when expert cadres 
arrive as a vanguard outfit in what has up till then been a localized 
conflict. They may serve as advisers or combat leaders as they mobilize 
indigenous people against a common enemy. And as guerrillas are 
becoming increasingly professional, more professional soldiers are 
fighting with guerrilla techniques, with no one side having a monopoly on 
reaching out across into the heartland of the other.34 
32 Ross A. Johnson, Total National Defense in Yugoslavia (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 
[1971]), 1. 
33 Lewis H. Gann, Guerrillas in History (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 88. 
34 Leebaert, To Dare and to Conquer, 25. 
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III. CONDITIONS FOR WAGING IRREGULAR WARFARE 
IW is dynamic in its characteristics and is shaped by several factors: social, 
environmental, and technological. Waging a war by irregular methods, one has to adopt 
these factors in an efficient way in order to offset their military and organizational 
weaknesses. Insurgents are not forced to use one specific means or method, but they are 
to make the best use of them to suit the environment.  
Lewis H. Gann compared two scholars’ arguments about the necessary conditions 
that are required for successful guerrilla warfare. Both—Clausewitz’s modern, and 
Giraldus Cambrensis’s from the middle ages—regardless of their many centuries of time 
difference, came to similar conclusions as to what these conditions are: (1) inaccessible 
and difficult to traverse extended geography, (2) strategically on the defense but tactically 
with the initiative, (3) the material character, and (4) the absolute importance of morale.35 
It would be more than mistaken to state that these conditions would fulfil the entire list of 
requirements for a successful guerrilla war, but certainly they are the fundamentals. This 
chapter will examine these conditions in detail, what their factors and characteristics are, 
and how they influenced the outcomes in some respective battles. 
A. STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
Similarly to Clausewitz’s renowned argument that “war is a continuation of 
policy by other means,” Galula paraphrased that, “Insurgency is the pursuit of the policy 
of a party, inside a country, by every means.”36 IW’s strategy is hardly definable in a way 
that can be put into a doctrine used by defense planners. Noteworthy irregular leaders, 
mainly based on their personal experiences, ended up with different strategies with slight 
or considerable differences, but they all had one common factor. There had been no sharp 
contours between the conditional prerequisites of a successful outcome. The following 
paragraphs in this section will present some major irregular fighters and leaders and their 
35 Gann, Guerrillas in History, 22–23. 
36 David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 3. 
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strategic thinking of how to wage war irregularly and conclude what contemporary 
military planners should consider.  
Mao Tse Tung listed several obvious and intuitive rationales: force the enemy to 
disperse, strike the weak points, avoid pitched battles unless you have overwhelming 
forces, etc. His strategic perspective, however, has some unique features that are different 
from other notable ones: (1) the relationship between offense and defense at the tactical 
and strategic levels; (2) The three phases (strategic defense, stalemate, strategic offense); 
and (3) the primacy of politics and the military actions in support of it. Unlike other 
theorists, he argued that, “tactical guerrilla actions alone, however cleverly executed or 
destructive, are insufficient to drive an enemy from one’s territory.”37  
One of Mao’s staunchest followers, General Vo Nguyen Giap, shared Mao’s 
strategy, but with a minor difference. During his studies, he absorbed the ideology of 
wearing down the stronger opponent; instead of adopting entirely Mao’s formula, which 
was the rural hit-and-run rather than taking the battle into urban area; Giap, however, 
believed that the irregular campaign needed to be conducted in the rural and urban area 
simultaneously.38 
Fidel Castro and Che Guevara together accomplished probably the most 
improbable guerrilla victory in history. With a few hundred fighters against some ten 
thousands they would not have been able to succeed without a great strategy and popular 
support. It is known that the Cuban army under President Batista was not in the best 
shape; they were conscripts and unwilling to fight. The Batista regime was already 
unpopular when Castro and Guevara came along, and here is where the two genuine 
guerrilla fighters prevailed in their strategy. They combined the small-scale attacks that 
were mainly directed by Che, and the large-scale publicity effort driven by Castro who 
had always shown a great capability to turn even unsuccessful military actions into 
propaganda triumphs. One can also see similar strategy in Al-Qaeda’s struggle, though 
37 FMFRP 12–18, Mao Tse-Tung: On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. BG Samuel B. Griffith (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of the Navy), 73. 
38 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 230. 
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with totally different causes and grievances; they are also experts in using media and the 
Internet or applying propaganda.   
T. E. Lawrence was a British intelligence officer who worked with the Arabian 
army against the Turks in 1916. Lawrence’s strategy was to wage irregular warfare and 
attack vulnerable points along the railroad supply lines of the Turks, and he also looked 
to avoid pitched battles with them. He believed that the superior maneuverability of his 
camel-mounted Arab allies would overstretch the Turkish capability to defend against 
their mobility. The insurgency would force the Turks to defend against “phantoms” and 
further undermine their security, generating ever more targets for Lawrence and his 
associates. Lawrence was successful in incorporating technology as well as desert 
wisdom into his maneuvers. 
Regardless of what approaches a country decides to fit into its defense strategy, or 
what combination of the others would work, an extremely important saying of Mao Tse 
Tung is worth considering: guerrillas need a strategy. History provides examples to show 
that no irregular strategy worked perfectly. They have either lacked some features that 
were needed to be successful or were not applied when it was necessary. It is hardly 
possible to list all the influential features, so the following paragraph will summarize 
some important characteristics to be taken in account when thinking about either the 
tactical or strategic level of IW.  
(1) Public opinion: During the American Revolution, the insurgents manipulated 
the population in an effective way that helped to offset the advantages of their opponent. 
Public opinion has also played a decisive rule in the following centuries of British and 
U.S. history, in Greece in the 19th century rebellion against the Turks, or just recently in 
Lebanon, where Hezbollah skillfully used this relatively new weapon. Along the same 
lines, (2) “winning the hearts and minds” was a declaration of the famous 
counterinsurgent Gerald Templer in Malaya; it is highly emphasized that popular local 
support can decisively affect the outcome of the conflict, as the (3) “population-centric” 
believer of counterinsurgency General David Petraeus appreciated in Iraq, too. Another 
important thing to consider is (4) outside support. It can provide tremendous support in 
different areas. A third party’s security forces can tie down and overload the adversary, as 
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the French forces demonstrated by their continual attacks against the British army in the 
American Revolution. They can also provide insurgents with material support that is 
significant in turning the struggle to their advantage; for example, the Mujahidin were 
able to challenge the air superiority of the Soviet troops after the Stingers arrived from 
the CIA. Though not as substantial as the earlier two, passive support can effectively help 
guerrilla forces, for example by giving them space to maneuver, or in a case of 
neighboring countries, just not supporting their adversaries at all. Another fundamental 
point is that, in order to accomplish strategic goals, guerrillas are not required to defeat 
the enemy in a (5) decisive battle.  
Von der Heydte argues, “Irregular warfare actions only obtain their importance in 
the psychological reaction they elicit in the adversary…irregular warfare is 
fundamentally war of attrition.”39 Since guerrillas are mostly outnumbered and inferior in 
power they need even more understanding and (6) knowledge of the background and 
culture of their foe, so they can surprise and outmaneuver them.40 Without understanding 
their opponent, guerrillas would not be able to accomplish one of the strategically 
important tactical considerations by Mao: “Although the element of surprise is not absent 
in orthodox warfare, there are fewer opportunities to apply it than there are during 
guerrilla hostilities. In the latter speed is essential.”41  
Similar to (7) surprise, some other factors have important roles in regular warfare 
as well, but the main difference is that in guerrilla warfare there are not too many chances 
to conduct certain missions more than once. So guerrilla fighters have to be particularly 
skillful in applying their expertise or extraordinary capabilities like the Arabs used their 
special (8) mobility throughout endless deserts to surprise and outmaneuver the Turks in 
1916–18 or, as Von der Heydte puts up an excellent question regarding (9) cover and 
concealment: “Who isolates whom—psychologically and materially?—that is an issue in 
covert warfare.”42  
39 Von der Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, 38. 
40 Gann, Guerrillas in History, 88. 
41 FMFRP 12–18, Mao Tse-Tung: On Guerrilla Warfare, 97. 
42 Von der Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, 157. 
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Finally, and probably most importantly, an excellent tool in a guerrilla group’s 
hand is the wide variety of (10) media and mass communication systems. It is not only a 
great asset to influence public opinion, but also to mobilize supporters, organize financial 
support bases, recruit members, conduct propaganda activities, distribute training 
materials, establish logistic system, etc. Even though terrorism—in its contemporary 
international interpretation—is not an exemplary method of IW, it is a fact that Al-Qaeda 
uses the media in an extremely skillful manner: “Bin Laden…was convinced that the ‘the 
media war’ was one of the ‘strongest methods’ of promoting jihadism—its ratio may 
reach 90 percent of the total preparation of the battles.”43 
B. GEOGRAPHY 
Back in ancient times, the Roman army was probably the most formidable 
fighting force, and almost no one could defeat them while in open terrain. They moved in 
massed but flexible legionary formations, and effectively deployed their weapons (seven-
foot-long javelin, rectangular shield, and double-edged gladius short sword) with an 
accompanying psychological effect that was a terrifying scream. Also, numerous 
specialists supported these legions from the rear, such as road-building experts, artillery 
mechanics, bridging, logistics, etc. The morale standard was also high. As soon as this 
tough army was caught in treacherous terrain and stressed by skillful guerrillas, however, 
their superiority quickly disappeared. This is what exactly happened to Cestius Gallus’s 
army: 
It marched along narrow, winding mountain paths from Jerusalem heading 
for the Roman-held cities of the Mediterranean coast. The legionnaires 
and their local allies were beset by lightly armed Jewish fighters who 
would fire their slingshots or javelins from above and dash down to pick 
off stragglers with swords and knives. With their heavy armor and 
equipment, weighing up to a hundred pounds per man, the legionnaires 
were too slow to catch these nimble harassers…All they could do was 
cower under their shields and pray to their deities.44 
43 Boot, Invisible Armies, 523. 
44 Ibid., 2. 
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In this battle, using the terrain effectively, the Jewish guerrillas managed to cause 
a humiliating defeat to the Roman army, who lost more 5,700 of its soldiers.45 
Another example when geographic condition played a decisive role in a conflict 
happened more recently. In written history, the only successful slave revolt occurred in 
1804, in Haiti. Haitian independence was proclaimed on the first of January in that year. 
Despite the fact that in Jamaica other slaves, called maroons, developed surprisingly 
skillful guerrilla capabilities and managed to hold or counter the British attacks for 
decades, finally they got subdued. The only slaves that succeeded in toppling the colonial 
regime were the Haitians; a significant part of their victory, however, was that the 
tropical climate was an extremely favorable ground for mosquitos, which as Max Boot 
notes, “mosquitos that, unbeknownst at the time, spread yellow fever and malaria. These 
insect warriors, ‘the most terrible of all enemies’…accounted for the vast majority of 
casualties among European troops.”46 
There could be numerous examples from recent ages where terrain, weather, 
climate or population density influenced the outcome of a conflict, and even nowadays 
large, powerful armies are still facing great difficulties fighting against insurgencies in 
rough terrain. In the following paragraphs the influential factors of geography will be 
discussed based on David Galula’s excellent study on counterinsurgency. Even in regular 
warfare the essential factors are important. If irregulars do not attempt to exploit the 
advantages of their environment it can directly lead to failure; on the other hand, it can be 
highly beneficial if they find the effective use of it.  
Galula lists eight different factors that have either advantageous or 
disadvantageous effects.47 The first is location: It is disadvantageous to the irregulars if 
the land where the struggle happens is isolated by natural obstacles or surrounded by 
desert, sea or ocean. Also, if the neighboring countries are not sympathetic to the 
45 Boot, Invisible Armies, 2. 
46 Ibid., 100. 
47 Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare, 26. 
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guerrillas’ cause that makes it even more difficult to be supported by a “third party” if 
any is available.  
The second factor is international borders: This factor relates to the location, 
especially when the countries alongside the borderline are sympathetic to the insurgents. 
In this case, the longer the frontier line is the more chance to get efficient support from 
abroad, and the more maneuver space the guerrillas have.  
The third factor is size: The larger the country is, the harder it is to control for the 
regime in power. It gives more maneuverable space to the irregulars, which is probably 
one of their most valuable means to wage their war. As cited in Kiras’s study, Colonel 
Charles Callwell (1906) appreciated that “irregulars possessed the strategic advantages of 
time, maneuver, intelligence, limited supply requirements, and the initiative to accept 
battle at a time and place of their own choosing.”48  
The fourth factor is configuration: If a country can be divided into smaller parts or 
compartmentalized in order to keep control, it obstructs the insurgents. Due to the fact 
that Greek communist partisans stuck to their bases and had to defend them permanently, 
they lost because the national forces had an easy task to localize and overrun them. Also, 
if an area of operation of the conflict is an archipelago, like the Philippines, the freedom 
of movement is limited for the insurgents, and in this instance, sea power becomes more 
important.  
Galula’s fifth factor is terrain: This factor cannot be designated to either side as 
definite advantage or disadvantage. For sure it is favorable for the insurgents if the terrain 
is covered by mountains, swamps, and jungle lands or forest that are impassable by 
armored or motorized vehicles (e.g., the heavily forested mountains of Cuba helped 
Castro and Che, and the jungle of Malaya gave a robust advantage to the insurgents). If 
the terrain is sparsely covered by vegetation, however, or provides only limited ground 
for cover and concealment, the technological edge of the counterinsurgents will increase 
their advantage.  
48 Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 249. 
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The sixth factor is climate: It is generally believed that extreme climate will be 
advantageous for the insurgent units, but it is not. First, the counterinsurgents usually 
have a much better logistical system and operational facilities to keep their equipment in 
appropriate condition; for example, the rainy season in Indochina was a perpetual 
headache for the Vietminh. Second, extreme temperatures can bring guerrilla activities to 
a standstill, as the winter months nearly stopped the FLN in Algeria, or more recently the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. Third, even though the insurgents are used to living in austere 
conditions, the prolonged hardship will even more negatively influence their morale in 
extreme climate conditions.  
The seventh factor is population: From a geographical perspective, the population 
counts whether they are densely packed or widely distributed. A scattered population 
favors the insurgents, since it is more difficult to control. Also, the high ratio of rural to 
urbanized areas gives more advantage to the guerrillas.  
Finally, the eighth factor is economy: This factor can work both ways. An 
economically weak country will be much more “hospitable” for guerrilla warfare, since 
they have not too much to lose, but it will not provide good conditions either to the 
insurgents or to the countering forces. A stronger country will, nevertheless, worry about 
their wealth, and if the guerrilla fight lasts too long, the population can easily turn against 
the movement, even if initially they were not hostile to it. 
Although Galula’s list is wide enough for a thorough analysis of the geographical 
condition, it is worthwhile to acknowledge the fact that today most conflicts are waged in 
or at least near an urbanized area. Urbanized guerrilla warfare consists of many 
activities, ranging from marches to disruption, even political assassinations. The 
technological development, the unlimited availability of technical goods is more seen in 
large cities than in rural areas. Also those skillful people, who are either highly educated 
technicians or extremely talented “do it yourself” amateurs and who live in large cities, 
are much easier to recruit. A densely populated city will provide at least as good cover 
and concealment for insurgents as a jungle does. Additionally, it gives more possibility to 
organize the kind of mass movement that the strategy requires. Also, targeting the 
essential services that large cities depend on can be a useful tool against civil 
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disobedience. Nevertheless, though urban guerrilla warfare can provide tremendous 
opportunities for a good result; it also has its limitations. Attacking essential public 
services can alienate the population, the risk of exposure is more than in rural areas, and 
insurgents can only operate in very small units.  
To conclude the geographical section, an ideal area for an IW to be waged from 
the perspective of the weak would meet the following conditions: 
• a large land-locked country that has at least one neighboring country that 
supports the cause 
• the terrain is mostly jungle covered and mountainous, or else has scattered 
swamps in the plains 
• economically poor 
• the population is widely dispersed in the rural areas, but there are a few 
larger cities. 
C. HUMAN NATURE THAT IS DESIGNED FOR IW 
Samuel Gridley Howe, while serving with Greek soldiers in their War of 
Independence early in the Nineteenth Century, wrote about their strengths and 
weaknesses: 
A Greek soldier is intelligent, active, hardy, and frugal; he will march or 
rather skip, all day among the rocks, expecting no other food than a biscuit 
and a few olives, or a raw onion…But he will not work, for he thinks it 
disgraceful; he will submit to no discipline, for he thinks it makes a slave 
of him; he will obey no order which does not seem to him a good one, for 
he holds that in [these] matters he has a right to be consulted.49 
This behavior makes the Greeks seem cowardly; but Howe also observed that, if 
one let these soldiers fight in their own way, they were the bravest. In its classical 
interpretation, a “good soldier” does not necessarily fulfill the requirements of a good 
irregular soldier. So what human characteristics would make a good guerrilla fighter? 
This section will start with some historical examples where human nature was decisive in 
a successful irregular type of warfare. It will be followed with a list of characteristics that 
49 Boot, Invisible Armies, 103. 
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design an effective irregular type fighter. After that, it identifies some motivations of 
waging irregular war. This section will conclude the advantages of the weak from the 
human perspective.  
The famous “Gideon effect” derives from his great deception against the 
Midianites; that operation, however, would not be successful against more than 30 
thousand Midianites without the specifically selected 300 men. “Gideon’s purpose was to 
panic the enemy, not let panic creep into his own small force through men insufficiently 
sound.”50 Because of their lifestyle, Native American Indians were masters of the dark 
forests. George Washington wrote in his memoirs, “Only Indians were a match for 
Indians. Perhaps a mere ten on their home ground were the equivalent of a hundred 
soldiers.”51 There have been always exceptions, however; in this instance, Rogers’ 
Rangers were a match for them.  
In 1832 in Chechnya, the Murids fought with such a fanatical resistance that even 
the absolute superiority of the Russian forces did not convince them to surrender. Their 
only wish to the demand of capitulation was a message to their family: “We want no 
quarter; the only grace we ask of the Russians is to let our families know that we died as 
we lived, refusing submission to any foreign yoke.”52 Their leader escaped by a 
legendary action from this specific battle, but kept fighting for a quarter century and 
became a renowned guerrilla commander.  
The above-mentioned examples give us a certain concept that some groups or 
individuals are specifically designed for guerrilla warfare. But what human capabilities 
make a guerrilla fighter even more successful? One is patience: Since it has been 
supported by several noteworthy scholars that irregular warfare is time-consuming, 
patience is a key factor in the human nature. Based on his own experience while fighting 
on the side of the British crown, Johann Ewald observed, “British troops were not really 
suitable for the small war, because they did not have sufficient patience for this difficult 
50 Leebaert, To Dare and to Conquer, 44. 
51 Ibid., 236. 
52 Boot, Invisible Armies, 156. 
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and laborious kind of warfare.”53 In Marx’s mind the key to a successful revolution was 
the organization itself, and patience.54  
Another requisite human capability is endurance: Since mobility and 
maneuverability are some of the most important tactical considerations in guerrilla 
warfare, its fighters need to be exceptionally frugal. Absent the Arab’s frugality, T. E. 
Lawrence would not be able to use so effectively the Arabs against the widely dispersed 
Turkish defensive lines, amid the surrounding harsh terrain. Similarly, Robert Rogers 
would not be able to conduct so many long-range reconnaissance patrols behind the 
enemy lines without possessing an extreme enduring capability to live and hike for 
months in the field. 
Adaptability is another necessary capability: Johann Ewald’s observation still 
holds true in modern doctrines. According to his written experiments, partisan leaders 
need independent thought to identify and exploit opportunities, preserve mobility, and 
make the best possible use of available assets.55 Another capability is Improvisation: 
Cortés was not a named irregular leader, but rather a “special force” commander. 
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that he fought the Aztecs in an environment that fits into 
irregular warfare. During their struggle the Spanish were often outnumbered, their 
technological advantage did not count in urban areas, and they had poor outside support. 
Their “ability further to exploit the virtues of small size to move straight in while 
improvising continuously (not the hallmark of most big battle forces),”56 however, took 
them all the way to their targets.  
A final vital capability is a “Desperado” mentality: Similarly to the necessary 
guerrilla “mindset,” while recruiting for OSS and SOE this type of individual came in 
handy for Brigadier Dudley Clark and Colonel William Donovan. The latter demanded 
53 Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 241. 
54 Ibid., 244. 
55 Ibid., 241. 
56 Leebaert, To Dare and to Conquer, 151. 
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soldiers who were “calculatingly reckless with disciplined daring, who are trained for 
aggressive action.”57  
It is not the intent of this paper to advocate some weird characteristics of tribal 
guerrilla forces, but if one hangs up moral judgment for a second, it can be accepted that 
brutality and remorselessness are still characteristics that supported several guerrilla 
leaders in some “Non-Western” countries. It is obvious to everyone that child soldiers, 
IEDs, and ruthlessly living off people are all totally inhuman actions, but as Anna Simons 
says in her study, “When a society doesn’t care what happens to members of a rival 
society, combatants will feel little to no compunction about indulging in acts we would 
never countenance.”58 In modern irregular warfare, “Western countries” place more and 
more restraints on the procedures. The problem is that the potential enemies do not and 
increasingly target civilians.  
Finally, motivation is probably the most important feature to analyze. There are 
several factors that can motivate irregular fighters. When the Boer and Filipino insurgents 
were defeated, Filipinos suffered much more, because the Boers were inspired by their 
great nationalist sentiment. Another good example of being motivated is the American 
militias who were able to take endless suffering for their freedom and independence. 
Being humiliated by the strong makes the weak even more willing to fight. In irregular 
warfare, youths are the dominant participants for just such motives. Besides the fact that 
their conspiracy is the most important, they are also motivated by (1) seeking status to 
test themselves for their adulthood and (2) defeating the oppressor, who is usually 
personalized as Goliath (while the youth see themselves as David, who represents the 
oppressed).59  
As with terrorism, in many insurgent movements the motives can be summarized 
thus: revenge, renown, reaction. Louis Richard argues that “terrorist movements pursue 
these two sets of long- and short-term motivations simultaneously. Moreover, 
57 William J. Morgan, The OSS and I (New York: Norton, 1957), 281. 
58 Anna Simons, “21st Century Cultures of War: Advantage Them,” Foreign Policy Research 
Institute: The Philadelphia Papers (2013), 25. 
59 Ibid., 16. 
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philosophical or political aspirations are of greater interest to the leadership of the 
movements, while followers are more attracted by the nearer-term appeal of revenge, 
renown, and reaction.”60 
Having analyzed the human capabilities and characteristics, the motives that can 
formulate a “good” guerrilla fighter, based on Anna Simons’ observation, will be 
identified. (1) The weak can out-communicate the strong using language and “homeland” 
knowledge; (2) code-switch: Irregular leaders have a better knowledge how to 
communicate to their men, and also when it becomes necessary they can easily recognize 
what “language” the other side speaks. (3) “They know what they can get away with 
given our patterns of behavior.” Counterinsurgents are mainly aware of what 
organizations, or what types of networks the irregulars are operating in, but rarely 
understand what their values are. Contrarily, irregulars are aware of the values of the 
invaders and they can effectively harass those values (for example, time). (4) Irregulars 
are more sophisticated than they are given credit for. (5) They have a different 
conception of power, do not believe in fairness, and are willing to experiment with 
violence.61 
D. FINANCIAL LIMITATIONS AND FINANCIAL ADVANTAGES 
The following section will analyze the financial condition of IW from two 
perspectives. One is from the insurgent’s side pointing out why IW is cheap, and how it 
can be supported from “above” and from “below” or from outside. It will be followed by 
indicating how the financial factor can support the insurgent. Finally, how would Special 
Forces reduce the expenditures of a country on its military? 
Before one goes to a shopping center to buy a thing, a responsible person would 
check a few things: Is there an appropriate shopping center, do they carry the things that 
she or he needs, is transportation available, etc. The main point, however, is to see what 
is the amount that one can afford to spend, while still purchasing a good quality product. 
Similarly, a small country that cannot afford to spend a huge amount of money for its 
60 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want (New York: Random House, 2006), 81. 
61 Simons, “21st Century Cultures of War,” 17. 
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defense may have to look for a cheaper solution, while still being able to effectively 
deploy forces to protect their sovereignty.  
Many noteworthy scholars ended up with the same argument that insurgency is 
cheap and counterinsurgency is expensive. The common view is that guerrillas live from 
hand-to-mouth. That is true up to a certain point. In the preparation phase, they also need 
to think about their re-supply system, particularly ammunition and weapons. These are 
the most critical things that cannot be procured through civilian lines. Insurgents, 
however, do not need extremely heavy weapon systems. Rather, they need small arms 
and explosives that can be transported without being compromised and also easily hidden 
when not in use. 
Colonel Savo Drljevic, a comrade-in-arms of Tito, listed what the important 
weapons for a modern guerrilla are: rifles, light and medium mortars, machine guns, 
grenades, explosives, and various light rockets, to name but a few.62 Since the 
counterinsurgents’ most effective assets are helicopters, it is wise to think about anti-air 
rockets as well, as these helped the Mujahidin fighters against the Soviets. When the 
conspiracy comes “from above,” it is easier to supply the insurgents with these, since 
governments, authorities, and military commands can legally possess them prior to the 
conflict. To support the movement “from below” (i.e., the population) with weapon 
systems is more problematic and barely can be legally procured through the commercial 
market system. Whether “from below” or “from above,” however, this equipment is 
significantly cheaper than jet fighters, submarines, up-armored vehicles, or drones. 
Furthermore, even though Al-Qaeda or the Taliban represents the dark side of 
globalization, they still mount a successful fight with the cheap and reliable AK family, 
RPGs and either home-made or former military explosive ordnance.63  
The interested “third power” can be likewise a great supporter, not only in the 
communication field to provide a propaganda platform or geographically by offering 
maneuver space or training areas, but also by delivering weapons, ammunition or 
62 Von der Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, 143. 
63 Boot, Invisible Armies, 517. 
 28 
                                                 
advisors.64 The other significant financial feature is accommodation and food. In ancient 
times the Mongols, the Arabs, the Huns, and many more nomad tribes—the ones who 
fought irregularly according to the contemporary doctrines—could live without major 
supply in a harsh terrain for longer than their adversaries.  
Nowadays, these nomads are not a determining factor, but guerrillas also have the 
possibility to live without major logistical bases or dining facilities that are often able to 
feed 20,000 people three times a day plus midnight meal for duty personnel. Their great 
advantage is that their basic living needs are either provided by themselves, when they 
pause guerrilla operations and live as regular members of society, or by other sources that 
are not involved in the fight at all. One of the greatest issues in conventional warfare is 
the mobilization of forces. Taking into account that it requires transportation, fuel, 
maintenance, and human resources, guerrillas have another financial advantage, since 
they are mobile on their own, and do not require a great logistical system to move troops 
from point A to point B.    
Another perspective on financial disruption relates to how it supports the 
insurgents. Galula argues in his study of counterinsurgency that, “Promoting disorder is a 
legitimate objective for the insurgent...it serves to undermine the strength and the 
authority of the counterinsurgent. Moreover, disorder—the normal state of nature—is 
cheap to create [and] very costly to prevent.”65 It is really easy to create disorder. A few 
phone calls can create a fully disrupted airline schedule, and blowing up Metro vehicles 
can paralyze the public transport system.  
From a military perspective, to blow up one or two bridges would force the 
occupying force to reinforce each bridge. Cutting wires on the streets would compel the 
counterinsurgent to mount protective measures to each vehicle or change their entire 
standing operational procedures. Or, as happened in Indochina or in Algeria, when 
insurgents burned a farm, other farms and village requested protection.66 Since occupying 
64 Von der Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, 179. 
65 Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare, 8. 
66 Ibid. 
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forces cannot neglect the need to maintain order, their expense ratio will be far higher 
than the guerrillas.  
Like in Algeria, the FLN’s estimated annual cost of waging their war was 
approximately 30–40 million USD, an amount that the French had to spend every two 
weeks. “Because of the disparity of cost and effort, the insurgent can thus accept a 
protracted war, the counterinsurgent should not.”67 As Lewis H. Gann wrote, the French 
withdrawal from Vietnam supports this idea, as well: “Dien Bien Phu did not by any 
means knock out the French Army, but the French were tired of fighting a desperately 
bloody and expensive war…and in 1954 they gave up the struggle.”68 
Since 1648, when the Treaty of Westphalia called for the release of POWs 
without ransom, “The state is thinking in large-scale rational administrative terms: 
strategy is as much dutifully financial as gloriously military.”69 Regardless of how 
wealthy a country is, it has been a great consideration for some centuries to wage a war as 
economically as possible.  
Special operations are similar to guerrilla warfare in several aspects. Both conduct 
operations mainly independently or semi-independently in small units behind an enemy’s 
lines or rear. Beyond others, their tactical advantages are speed, surprise, accuracy, and 
mobility. Obviously, special operators are not grown just anywhere. Their training is 
time-consuming and compared to regular “mass-produced” infantry soldiers is more 
expensive. As soon as a special operator is fully operational, however, their employer can 
benefit much more than from those that are trained on an equivalent amount of money. 
The largest advantage of Special Forces against guerrillas is that they are specifically 
trained, equipped and organized before the preparation phase; being so, they will not 
produce as much wasted energy or unnecessary losses as an inexperienced, newly 
recruited guerrilla fighter would do. 
67 Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare, 9. 
68 Gann, Guerrillas in History, 72. 
69 Leebaert, To Dare and to Conquer, 229. 
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IV. THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON IN 2006 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since its infancy in 1981, Hezbollah has fought for over three decades in 
accordance with the classical interpretation of terrorist tactics. In its tactical repertoire 
one could find several different tactics, from high-profile attacks to low-profile 
harassments. The group’s main form of attacks were (1) hijacking: the most famous was 
the capture of a TWA flight in 1985, resulting in the murder of one American sailor; (2) 
suicide bombing: between 1981 and 1999 the organization conducted many vehicle-, 
man-, or motorbike-borne suicide attacks mainly on Israeli headquarters, U.S. military 
installations, or even public places, killing hundreds of foreign soldiers and civilians; and 
(3) hostage taking: in the 1980s, nearly 100 hostages were seized, and not all of them 
have been released alive.70  
Hezbollah’s main cause was to force out the unwelcome Israeli “invaders” of the 
lands of Lebanon. Following the example of Iran, it also sought to create an Islamic 
Republic. Thanks to a thoroughly calculated strategy and substantial Iranian support, 
Hezbollah was successful in driving the Israelis from Lebanon in 2000. The struggle 
between the organization and Israel, however, remained. 
Hassan Nasrallah, who like Mao and Ho recognized the importance of politics, is 
a prominent Hezbollah leader. Under his guidance, Hezbollah became a political party 
and basically expanded its strategy with three extremely important factors. First, it started 
to provide social services for the poor Shi’as in order to gain more popular support; 
second, it ramped up its media campaign, in which it was more successful in sending out 
its messages than the entire Israeli state; and third, it demonstrated an increased capability 
to fight the IDF using irregular warfare. Nevertheless, with this extended strategy 
Hezbollah finally compelled the Israeli troop withdrawal from Lebanese lands in 2000. It 
also made a fresh demand for Israeli-occupied farms on the Golan Heights. That did not 
really help a final consolidation of peace between Israel and Hezbollah, and in 2006 the 
70 Boot, Invisible Armies, 504–505. 
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prolonged tension led to a “34-day invasion” of Lebanon that included several air strikes 
(Israeli Air Force-IAF), naval blockade and naval gunfire (Israeli Navy-IN) and ground 
assault (Israeli Land Forces-ILF) into Hezbollah-controlled territories.  
The Lebanon Campaign started on the 12th of July when Hezbollah infiltrated 
into Israeli territories and killed three and captured two Israeli soldiers while patrolling. 
In retaliation, the following day Israel started an air campaign targeting Hezbollah strong 
points, observation posts and rocket launcher sites. Hezbollah did not possess significant 
anti-air assets, so while being bombed by the IAF they started a severe retaliatory stream 
of rocket fire into Israeli territories. As a result of IAF bombings, they lost numerous 
rocket sites; the IAF, however, still had difficulties in detecting and knocking out the 
famous Katyusha sites, since it took only minutes to set up such sites.  
The first major IDF ground movement started on the 19th of July. The Israeli 
advance faced a much tougher defense than had been expected. During the first half of 
the invasion, Israeli ground forces did not attempt to hold positions systematically. This 
changed after the 31st of July, when Israeli leadership ordered its troops to take and hold 
a security zone alongside the border area, 10‒15 miles deep in Lebanese territory. The 
Israeli intent was to push the advance north all along the border. Hezbollah had no front 
to defend, so they could attack the IDF from unexpected directions; this they did 
proficiently enough that the IDF lost significant numbers of soldiers and material.  
The turning point, however, came with an even more dangerous weapon: 
Hezbollah used the media so expertly that international pressure dramatically increased 
on Israel to cease the offensive. Finally, on the 14th of August, a cease-fire agreement 
went into effect, Israeli troops withdrew behind their borders, and Hezbollah remained in 
the southern part of Lebanon.71 
  
71 Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign (Monograph, Strategic 
Studies Institution). 
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B. STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
Again, Mao’s excellent observation applies perfectly to Hezbollah’s overall 
actions during this short war against Israel: “tactical guerrilla actions alone…are 
insufficient to drive an enemy from one’s territory.”72 It is hard to define what exact 
model of warfighting Hezbollah followed, but it was neither a “clear guerrilla” nor a 
“clear conventional” approach. On the strategic level, putting too much effort into 
holding ground, seeking concealment mainly by the terrain instead of intermingling with 
the civilians, and the “over-concentrated” forces represented major differences from an 
irregular movement. On the other hand, the overly permissive yielding of territory, the 
dependence on harassing fire and unattended minefields, the excessive dispersal of 
Hezbollah forces are considered more in accordance with irregular warfare.73 
Hezbollah’s tactical and operational skills were far from perfect, but operated on a 
significantly higher level than many states in the Middle East. Soon after their formation, 
Hezbollah became a well-honed and very effective guerrilla force. Hezbollah fighters 
expertly exploited their knowledge of the local terrain and population. After the incident 
on the 12th of July 2006, Hezbollah did not expect such a large-scale invasion as a 
response from Israel, and their strategic plan did not mirror any renowned guerrilla 
strategists’ work.  
From Mao to Che, or from Giap to T. E. Lawrence, one might see only a minor 
irregular strategy applied during this conflict. Giap believed in the simultaneous attack in 
rural and urbanized terrain. It is hard to say Hezbollah’s intent was to follow Giap, but 
for sure their strategy did not draw a line between the cities and rural areas. Most likely, 
their most effective weapon in their strategy was the media. As has been already shown 
in history, media has sometimes had much more significant effect than any type of 
weapon system. Castro and Che would not have been able to accomplish their goal 
without an expert influence on public opinion, and T. E. Lawrence himself referred to the 
72 FMFRP 12–18, Mao Tse-Tung: On Guerrilla Warfare, 73. 
73 Biddle and Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign, xiii. 
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printing press as the greatest weapon; similarly, Hezbollah would have never succeeded 
without the excellent manipulation of the worldwide media: 
The turning point of the war was the July 30 Israeli air strike on suspected 
Hezbollah positions in the town of Qana. An apartment building was 
flattened, leading to the death of seventeen children and eleven adults. 
(Initially casualty estimates were much higher.) The resulting footage of 
mangled bodies being pooled out of the wreckage, which Hezbollah made 
sure received widespread distribution, increased pressure on Israel to halt 
its offensive, which was said to be “disproportionate.”74 
Hezbollah not only gained the pressure against the Israeli Defense Forces, but 
certain sympathy came to its cause from more and more dominant actors. 
In their study, Biddle and Friedman identified four variables to gauge whether the 
2006 campaign was a classical guerrilla war or its conventional opposite:75 The first one 
was the balance of brute force and coercion: Hezbollah, as the much weaker actor of the 
conflict, was aware that Israel could invade Lebanon with no major difficulties and 
destroy the short-range rocket sites before their desired effect had been reached. A brute 
force defensive capability—certainly not a classic guerrilla tactic—was needed in the 
southern part of Lebanon that might be able to interrupt an Israeli invasion for long 
enough to enable a coercive strategy to succeed.  
The second variable is the relative concentration of combat power: Hezbollah was 
much more concentrated than many guerrilla forces in recent history, but not even close 
as dense as any standard conventional procedure dictates, and was far outnumbered by 
the IDF.  
The third variable is the military organization of the theater of war: It is hard to 
find any unclassified documentation about Hezbollah dispositions during the conflict, but 
from IDF reports it is possible to see that IDF could occupy many areas without any 
countering forces, or against only very light resistance. There were, however, much 
stronger defensive preparations in some villages. These were located in the vicinities of 
74 Max Boot, “Iraq: Baghdad without America,” 511, accessed May 2, 2014, 
http://www.newsweek.com/iraq-baghdad-without-america-65997. 
75 Biddle and Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign, 47–53. 
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key road junctions or those villages nearest the border. Another important factor was that 
“Hezbollah exercised a degree of hierarchical, differentiated command and control over 
subunits operating in key areas during the campaign, making apparent decisions to favor 
some sectors over others, hold in some places but yield in others, counterattack in some 
locations but withdraw elsewhere.”76  
Finally, the fourth variable is the sensitivity of dispositions to the political 
orientation of the population: Guerrillas heavily rely on the population. In southern 
Lebanon, the Shiite and Christian distribution might have seriously influenced the 
dispositions of forces, so in this factor, unlike the others, Hezbollah methods 
approximated the guerrilla extreme to a high degree. 
Another important distinction is that guerrilla fighters do not necessarily need to 
be expert in many areas, but it can help them. On the tactical level, Hezbollah was 
significantly skillful in many areas. The group demonstrated proficiency in camouflage 
and cover and concealment, placing minefields to canalize Israeli forces into concentrated 
engagement areas, small-scale coordinated attacks, coordination of supporting fire often 
from different directions, consistent fire discipline, to name but a few; however, they 
were short of the conventional standards of larger-scale maneuver, combined arm 
operations, individual marksmanship, and flexibility to changing conditions. 
C. GEOGRAPHY 
Four major geographic landscapes form Lebanon. There are two mountain chains 
running from the South to the North. Between these two mountains a large fertile plain 
lays, the Bekaa Valley, which was basically the birthplace of Hezbollah. Besides Israel, 
the other neighboring country to Lebanon is Syria whose ruling regime is mainly 
supportive of Hezbollah’s cause. With significant Syrian cooperation, Hezbollah located 
most of its training in camps in this valley. The fourth landscape is the narrow coastal 
trip, where the capital and most of the major cities are located. The coastal part is fairly 
large to allow trading sea lines stay open; however, Israeli Navy could blockade some of 
them.  
76 Biddle and Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign, 59. 
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One can see that the geographical location of the country is not ideal, but it is 
advantageous from several contexts. Where the majority of the conflicts happened, the 
terrain provided good cover and concealment not only for fighting positions, but for 
maneuvering in small units. “Hezbollah made very effective use of local cover and 
concealment…but this was obtained almost entirely from the terrain—both natural and 
man-made.”77 
The chief battlefield of the campaign was the rural area; there was little urban 
fighting. The moderately urbanized borderline also provided advantageous maneuvering 
space for its units, and great cover for surprise attacks; though, during their preparation 
phase, Hezbollah had difficulties in the built-up areas with the population. 
Demographically, the dispersion of the people did not support the cause in every case: 
“The geographic distribution of Christians and Shiites.…may have reflected the 
difficulties in making systematic defensive preparations amid an unsupportive 
population—and especially, in keeping those preparations covert and hidden from Israeli 
intelligence and target acquisition.”78 Despite this, Hezbollah successfully dug tunnels 
between houses in order to be able to move between firing positions, or even years before 
the war, especially on the border areas where the construction of civilian houses was 
influenced by military considerations to reinforce the side from which the Israeli 
approach was expected. 
This campaign climate had no significant effect on either party to the conflict for 
two reasons. One is that the entire conflict lasted only 34 days, so even if Hezbollah had 
to live in a harsh environment they could stand it with no problem. Second, in 
summertime, when humidity or precipitation is very low, the weapons and other war 
materials require much less maintenance. 
  
77 Biddle and Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign, 44. 
78 Ibid., 61–62. 
 36 
                                                 
D. HUMAN FACTOR 
In 1982, when Hezbollah was formed following the Israeli invasion Lebanese 
youth were motivated by the resistance movement against the invaders. The spectrum of 
motivational factors has not changed today, but it is significantly extended. The degree is 
well defined by Nicholas Blanford in his article: “Today, however, the motivations for 
joining Hezbollah are more multidimensional, blending religious observance, hostility 
toward Israel, and the Shi’a commitment to justice and dignity.”79 
There are several human factors that characterize Hezbollah fighters, and without 
these factors they probably would not be as successful as they had been in their struggle 
against Israel. First and probably most important is their deep religious affiliation. Sheikh 
Khodr Noureddine—Hezbollah’s former political chief in south Lebanon—said: “Our 
Islamic beliefs make these young men refuse to accept injustice. They will do anything to 
resist Israel. I know the West does not understand, but our youth cannot live with 
Israel.”80 What really helps to commit to this extreme resistance is the fact that Hezbollah 
orients its recruitment process at an early age. Children are welcomed in Hezbollah’s 
youth movements, they receive propaganda in schools, organized plays, lectures even 
sporting events are held by the movement, so the first step to become a resistance fighter 
is consequentially established.  
From a weaker side’s perspective motivation has a meaningful importance to 
offset the material and numerical superiority. Hezbollah believed in the same: “…the 
unremitting religious and ideological instruction creates a combatant far superior to his 
opposite number in the Israeli army and helps overcome the organization’s material 
shortcomings in technology, weapons, and funds compared to Israel.”81 
After becoming a fighter, only a few are selected to become martyrs. Regardless 
that Hezbollah is associated with suicide bombing, they have rarely conducted such 
operations; however, martyrdom is not only the privilege of the suicide bombers, but the 
79 Nicholas Blanford, “Joining Hezbollah,” accessed May 1, 2014, 
http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=92. 
80 Blanford, “Joining Hezbollah.”  
81 Ibid. 
 37 
                                                 
ones who were selected to specific missions. Blanford explains this notion in his article: 
“This type of martyrdom is an alien concept in Western philosophy, which emphasizes 
the sanctity of life, but for many Hezbollah combatants, seeking death is a desirable 
outcome, one that is nurtured and constantly reinforced by the religious and cultural 
environment in which he lives.”82 
According to the reports of “veteran” Hezbollah fighters, their training is similar 
in many contexts to the “Western standard” special forces training. It is hard to obey the 
orders after several weeks of difficult training, endless marches, reduced portions on 
food, or extreme weather conditions. So self-discipline and obedience are also important 
human characteristics of Hezbollah members. The training not only given them military 
skill, but helps building up the esprit de corps: “Hezbollah’s military successes…helped 
convey among the cadres a sense of fraternal and communal pride, achievement, and 
empowerment, sentiments that also inspire new generations of volunteers to join the 
party.”83  
They also believe the quality and the integrity of the leadership was a great 
integral character of Hezbollah that supported the movement throughout of his struggle 
against Israel. Their belief, martyrdom, and leadership qualities are of great value in 
waging their war, as it has been summarized by Sheikh Naim Qassem, a Shi’a Hezbollah 
politician: 
Imagine the single machine gun with a faith in God and readiness for 
martyrdom and a faith in, and interaction with, the leadership, and then 
you have a person of great power who does not fear death. This differs 
from the enemy on the other side that does many calculations to protect 
itself]. Then our machine gun becomes more powerful than their artillery. 
This moral issue is quite essential.84  
  
82 Blanford, “Joining Hezbollah.” 
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid. 
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E. FINANCIAL FACTOR 
Hezbollah is a typical example of a non-state actor that relies on the financial 
support of a third party, as well as internal support. One of the most important resources 
of Hezbollah is Iranian state sponsorship due to Iranian interest in the outcome of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some Western diplomats estimated Iranian support at 
between 100 and 200 million USD per year. The majority of the income arrives in cash, 
but a significant amount of support is received in the form of weapons and 
communication systems, or by establishing training programs and camps. Another 
important resource is Syria. That country integrates Hezbollah fighters into its military 
training system, and also provides them weapons and ammunition support, including 
220mm rockets. Syrian agents often cooperate with Hezbollah operatives in planning and 
executing terrorist attacks in Israeli territories. One of Syria’s chief contributions is the 
hosting of the greatest concentration of Hezbollah training camps. This support frees up 
funds for Hezbollah that are gained from other different sources.85  
Despite the fact that Iran and Syria provide significant support to Hezbollah, and 
they do not need to rely on other sources as much as Al-Qaeda or Hamas, Hezbollah still 
raises its funds through other means. These include expatriate remittances from Lebanese 
living in Africa or North America, as well as charities and front organizations that are 
used to conceal their fundraising activities. Also, Hezbollah is involved in a wide variety 
of criminal acts ranging from smuggling to drug and illicit diamond trafficking.86  
The conduct of the 34-day war itself did not cost an extreme amount of money for 
Hezbollah. There are no available statistics about how much the group spent during the 
war, but several facts allow one to draw the conclusion that the type of war Hezbollah 
waged is more economical than the classical conventional one. The group did not use 
aerial vehicles that consume great quantities of fuel and cost large amounts of money and 
manpower. On land, they had weapons systems that required the least care, such as the 
AK-47 family, PKMs, and RPGs. These weapons are powerful and accurate enough 




                                                 
against infantry and light armored vehicles, and perfectly designed for prolonged usage 
with minimum maintenance.  
To reach its strategic goal—bombarding Israel—Hezbollah’s most effective 
weapon was the Katyusha rocket. The group had several thousand of them from mainly 
third-party support, but similar to the individual weapons, these rockets are the modest 
ones that can be operated with no significant supporting systems. Vehicular movement 
was also limited in Hezbollah strategy. Fighters stayed hidden as long as they could, and 
moved only when it was necessary. This also saved on fuel consumption and 
maintenance cost. The third main area that was cheap during the war was the way in 
which fighters were fed. It is true the Hezbollah fighters did not get overweight by the 
end of the war, since food did not come through central logistic support. They mainly fed 
themselves from either their own re-supply chain (families, friends, kinship) or were 
observed in several cases searching abandoned or still inhabited houses for food—in 
other words: “living off the land.”87 
Hezbollah’s preparations for war were more costly; some decisions, however, 
directly or indirectly reduced the cost. In some instances this involved using civilians for 
the construction of defensive positions. The evacuation of villages before the invasion 
decreased the collateral damage that would increase the expenditures after the war. On 
the tactical level, fighters were (for example) trained to not switch their weapon to 
automatic in order to not waste ammunition.88 Their payment system is quite effective, 
and explained by Hezbollah very clearly. The recruits receive very little or no payment 
from the organization for two or more years. One Hezbollah official noted, “If we gave 
them all Range Rovers, they wouldn’t want to fight anymore.”89 Hezbollah’s leaders 
believe that “the lure of cash can easily dull the sharp edge of commitment to the 
cause.”90 
87 Biddle and Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign, 58. 
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From a financial perspective, Hezbollah had probably fewer difficulties than other 
similar non-state actors on the “weaker side,” but this does not necessarily mean that they 
did not have to worry about financial problems. In a recent study, the RAND Corporation 
identified a mitigating variable that needed to be considered in case of state sponsorship:  
More support may not always be better for the non-state group in the long 
term—a group that becomes highly dependent on support may collapse 
when assistance is reduced or terminated. The motivation of the external 
sponsor is also a critical mitigating variable. In some cases, the sponsor 
may manipulate and undermine the capacity of the non-state group in 
order to ‘decommission’ or control it more effectively.91  
F. CONCLUSION 
It is almost impossible to identify properly what mode of warfare Hezbollah 
practiced. There were signs of irregular warfare, such as having no front lines, avoiding 
decisive battles, reliance on harassing fires and unattended minefields, and an over-
emphasis on coercion. But clearly it was not just a guerrilla fight. The group put too 
much effort into holding ground, the cover and concealment relied almost entirely on 
terrain instead of population, members intermingled and wore their own uniform, and 
their forces were too concentrated.  
In this chapter, the second Lebanon war has been analyzed from different 
perspectives. In the geographical sense, it can be concluded that from several aspects this 
condition for Hezbollah was more favorable than unfavorable. The human characteristics 
of Hezbollah’s chief manpower were perfectly applicable in a fight consisting of those 
social factors of Lebanon and the type of warfare that Hezbollah conducted. Finally, the 
financial background of the group’s fight was far better supported than such an 
organization might wish. Hezbollah is comfortable now, but this can have negative 
consequences in the long term.  
Finally, but most importantly even though the Israeli invasion was certainly 
unexpected at the time, the implemented strategy was suited extremely well to the given 
91 David E. Thaler et al., Improving the U.S. Military’s Understanding of Unstable Environments 
Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups: Insights from Social Science (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 
[2013]), 21. 
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conditions. From the strategic point of view, two major critical decisions are worth 
considering. First, Hezbollah applied great and effective tactics to hold or delay Israeli 
land forces to allow their “strategic” rocket capability to prevail. Second, while being 
successful on the ground, in the virtual world Hezbollah’s operatives influenced public 
opinion exceptionally well via their own media assets and the Internet, not only to 
enhance the “disproportionate” offensive act of the IDF, but to gain sympathy for their 
own cause.  
Overall, Hezbollah’s new “transitional” way of warfighting between the guerrilla 
and the conventional style opens up new dilemmas for defense planners. How to counter 
an adversary who emphasizes this type of warfighting, and would it be worth considering 
for one’s own defense strategy?  
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V. THE ETHIOPIAN INVASION OF SOMALIA IN 2006 
A. BACKGROUND 
The information to summarize the historical background of the invasion was 
taken from Ted Dagne’s research published by the Library of Congress’s Congressional 
Research Service.92 
In 1991, Somalia could hope for a positive change in their existence since Siad 
Barre’s 22-year dictatorship, which led the country into a lost war, unprecedented 
starvation and economic collapse, had been overthrown. The anti-Barre warlords, 
however, turned against each other and provoked a bloody civil war. Even the UN 
peacekeeping missions could not help, and none of the warlords had the edge over the 
others, so the country stayed in anarchy. After several failed attempts, including 
American intervention in 1992–93, in 2004 the fighting clans were able to establish a 
temporary government, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Its authority had 
been proportionally distributed between the clans, and it had its meetings in Baidoa from 
2006. Nevertheless TFG’s authority stayed limited, since in the spring of that same year 
the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took control of central and southern Somalia.  
ICU was formed in 2000 from 11 local Islamic autonomous courts in order to 
unify their decision making across clan lines and consolidate order under Islamic law 
(Sharia). In its initial phases, ICU managed to increase security and control in its 
territories. It re-opened the Mogadishu airport, pushed down the robbery and murder 
rates, and restarted waste management after 15 years without that service. Even the UN 
had some intent to influence TFG to start peace negotiations with ICU. Unfortunately, the 
internal conflict of ICU ended up with the victory of ICU radicals led by Sheik Aweys. 
The over-rigorous implementation of Sharia and the provocative speeches of Sheik 
Aweys against Ethiopia brought discontent into Ethiopian statecraft. It made it even 
worse that the ICU openly supported anti-Ethiopian resistance groups, and also they 
92 Ted Dagne, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, CRS Report RL33911 
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2011). 
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protected three Al-Qaeda top leaders. Ethiopia decided to prevent the ICU from 
establishing a radical Islamist country, so on the 24th of December 2006 they launched 
an invasion into Somalia against the ICU.  
The attack was unexpectedly successful, and by the end of January 2007 the 
Islamist forces had lost the war, but the consequences of this success were less favorable. 
The TFG-Ethiopian-U.S. triumvirate was very unpopular in the region—the U.S. did not 
open another front in her struggle against terrorism, but provided financial, economic, 
and military support to Ethiopia.  
TFG moved to Mogadishu to set their government facilities, but since their 
success was basically gained by the extremely disliked “ancient enemy” their prestige 
and power were very low. With African Union troops’ support—however very limited in 
numbers—and the involvement of moderate ICU members TFG had a chance to increase 
their legitimacy, but they refused to negotiate with “terrorist” Islamists. Consequently, 
frequent attacks happened against TFG and the peacekeeping forces by Islamist militias 
and the former ICU supporters. There were some reconciliation attempts in different 
locations and times, but all of them ended in failure. The security situation is 
continuously worsening due to the lack of authority of TFG, the increasing number of 
former ICU supporters infiltrating back from neighboring countries, and the interest of 
the international region, especially Eritrea. 
In the following sections ICU will be analyzed as the weaker side of the conflict 
from those preliminary conditions that have been described in Chapter III. 
B. STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
In 2006, the ICU’s success alarmed neighbors and sent warning signs through the 
international community. The TFG and Ethiopia simply labeled ICU as a terrorist 
umbrella organization supported by several foreign jihadi fighters, and Ethiopia intended 
to overrun the group if it acted against the TFG. ICU’s response was a defensive jihad 
and a rejection of all further peace talks under Arab League auspices. This was a mistake, 
as the group fell more quickly than it had originally risen. Within two weeks, Ethiopian 
and TFG forces—backed by U.S. military advisers, Special Forces and aerial support—
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killed several hundred Islamist fighters and dispersed the rest in a fast offensive. On 27 
December, ICU dissolved itself and surrendered political leadership to clan leaders.93  
Before the invasion, TFG received a large amount of arms; nevertheless, ICU had 
much more significant military force than TFG, since its support from internal and 
external parties was larger in quantity and more sophisticated in the type of arms, as well 
as in military material and financial support. Without external support, TFG would never 
have been able to defeat ICU. In a UN observer group’s report, ICU is characterized from 
a strategic perspective as follows:  
…they are focused, and have the drive and will to pursue their aims; they 
are proactive; they have a master plan, and strategies for accomplishing 
their plan that is substantially supported by elements from outside of 
Somalia—strategic guidance; and they are also operationally and tactically 
guided and directed with the help of outsiders; they have organization, 
cohesion—notwithstanding internal disagreements—and discipline; and 
importantly, they have the means.94  
ICU’s means included a gradually organized military-style force with a certain 
military command and control (C2) system, different forms of military training, the 
material and logistic systems that were necessary to support military operations and, very 
importantly, financial and economic strength. Against the existing temporary 
government, ICU’s strategy seemed to be working. It established C2 centers in diverse 
geographical areas, with an appropriate size of military units in order to maintain military 
superiority. Numerous training centers were established across its area of responsibility, 
where new members were recruited both from Somali militias and foreign fighters. 
Significantly adding to the insight of the ICU training was the experience of those 
“volunteers” who arrived from Middle Eastern and Asian conflicts. The ICU provided a 
certain degree of conventional training to its fighters, but from a long-term perspective 
foreign experience gave them far more:  
93 Africa Briefing, Somalia: The Tough Part is Ahead (Brussels/Nairobi: International Crises Group, 
[2007]). 
94 Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, UN Monitoring Group Report on Somalia, Security Council resolution 
1676 (2006), 42. 
 45 
                                                 
…foreign volunteers also provide training in guerrilla warfare and special 
topics or techniques consisting of bomb making and the use of bombs 
against different targets such as a variety of different types of transport 
and buildings. Other techniques include kidnapping and the conduct of 
assassination by ambush and sniping.95 
ICU’s objective successes are the result of the combined effect of all of these 
characteristics, but it could not match the incursion forces’ superiority in numbers and 
quality in a decisive battle. U.S. air and ground forces supported Ethiopian forces and the 
TFG took Mogadishu back from ICU and quickly overturned all their existing strategic 
gains. 
With ICU’s defeat in hand, the Ethiopian and TFG alliance could not gain 
significant long-term success. There has been no clear plan for stabilizing the country, so 
soon after the ICU was overthrown, the former head of ICU called for an insurgency, 
which soon coalesced under a group named Al-Shabaab. It was a completely battle-ready 
movement given that: “Somalia’s history is replete with fighters who have experience 
with asymmetrical warfare, small unit tactics, and a wide array of weaponry. One tactic 
that Al-Shabaab is said to have introduced to Somalia is suicide bombing. They have also 
carried out assassination attempts against Somali government officials.”96  
By 2008, former ICU members and their successor organization still waged their 
war so competently and effectively with a significant reliance on outside support that the 
Ethiopian government could not maintain its occupation of Somalia; in early 2009, 
Ethiopian troops left the country. 
C. GEOGRAPHY 
From the perspective of a “weaker” side, Somalia does not really fit into the ideal 
geographic posture. It is located in the “Horn of Africa,” with probably the longest 
coastline on the continent: about 3000 km.97 Besides the well-known pirate ships, the 
95 Al-Nasser, UN Monitoring Group Report on Somalia, 42. 
96 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “The Strategic Challenge of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab,” Middle East 
Quarterly XVI, no. 4 (2009): 25. 
97 “Countries and their Cultures, Culture of Somalia,” accessed March 15, 2014, 
http://www.everyculture.com/Sa-Th/Somalia.html 
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ICU and its successors did not have any significant sea power, so their opponents could 
blockade the entire shore line if it was necessary. The few neighboring countries were 
neither a potential advantage nor disadvantage. Ethiopia obviously did not support ICU’s 
cause; the southern Somali border with Kenya, however, provided large maneuver space 
to the ICU leaders after their defeat and during their consolidation phase. TFG did not 
even possess the capability to effectively control some of the major cities, so the size of 
Somalia itself was enough to outmaneuver the temporary government forces. 
Most likely, one of the most effective resources of ICU was the “technical.” 
These thin-skinned 4x4 pick-up trucks mounted with different types of machine guns 
were great assets for maneuvering through the large plains that followed the coastal part 
of Somalia, and also the streets of the urbanized area. The terrain and vegetation 
throughout of the country did not give great opportunities to the insurgents for the 
purpose of cover and concealment. Especially in the southern and central areas, the 
endless plains supported the invaders, since they had air superiority, so it was hard to take 
cover while in open terrain. The vegetation is generally sparse everywhere except for the 
area between the two main rivers of Somalia.98 This obviously supports the invaders and 
counterinsurgents as well. In this part of the continent, the climate is a primary factor. 
Somali people distinguish four seasons: two wet and two dry. Generally, the temperature 
is hot, especially during the dry season, but since the fighters of ICU grew up in these 
circumstances, and are in their homeland where they are able to live off the land, it has no 
significant effect of their fighting capabilities.  
From a geographical perspective, the scattered population in the rural areas 
favored the insurgents far more than TFG. There has been no official census for decades 
in Somalia, however, though according to some official reports approximately three 
quarters of the Somalia people live in rural areas and one quarter in the cities.99 In the 
rural areas, it is hard to control the population, so it is easier for the insurgents to live off 
them. In larger cities, ICU has gained popularity within the population by restoring some 
public services. 
98 Ibid. 
99 “Countries and their Cultures, Culture of Somalia,”  
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D. HUMAN FACTOR 
It is very difficult to find a longer period in Somali history when they either lived 
in peace or in an environment where most of the Somalis did not have to suffer from 
poverty in a very harsh environment. The pastoral nomadic life, however, is 
advantageous from the context of guerrilla fighting. These people are used to living in 
hard circumstances for an extended period of time. Especially in the rural areas, families 
and smaller kinship groups move from place to place all around the year to find water and 
have to work extremely hard to get it from the wells. As I. M. Lewis experienced it, “…it 
took four days to water a hundred sheep and goats in small groups, and the wells had to 
be dug by day and by night to yield water.”100  
Additionally, to this hard life, Somali people train to be warriors throughout their 
life. They must fight continuously, either for water or food for their livestock: “… 
fighting starts from necessity to gain access to water and grazing. In the rainy seasons on 
the other hand, conflict tends to result from the desire, often long matured, to revenge 
previous wrongs and to satisfy honor and ‘name’, as the pastoralists put it.”101  
Due to the fact that it is almost indispensable for a man to be a good fighter in 
order to survive, historically the Somali people gave privileges to the warriors: “Somali 
society accorded prestige to the warrior…and rewarded military prowess. Except for a 
man of religion…and they were few in number, all Somali males were considered 
potential warriors. As a result, a culture of military readiness flourished throughout a long 
history of foreign invasion, colonial occupation, domestic conflict, and wars with 
neighboring countries.”102  
Similar to Native Americans, another dominant characteristic of the Somali 
fighter is his pride. Especially the northern Somalis have never been permanently 
subjugated. As I.M. Lewis concluded in his extended study of Somaliland colonialism, 
“Somali have been colonized they have never really been conquered.… By the 
100 I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 45. 
101 Ibid. 
102 “Mongabay, Somalia,” accessed May 2, 2014, http://www.mongabay.com/history/somalia/somalia-
the_warrior_tradition_and_development_of_a_modern_army.html. 
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establishment of international frontiers the great movements of the clans have to some 
extent been arrested, but the pastoralists’ inordinate pride and contempt for other nations 
remained unchallenged.”103  
The motivations for their fight come from three main directions. One of them is 
their opportunistic mindset as a result of everyday suffering, and missing a better 
perspective. Second are the deep roots to the collective clan affiliation: “… it is his unity 
with his kinsmen against aggression, and his collective responsibility with them in feud 
and war, which dominates the way in which the pastoralist values the support of his 
kin.”104 The third motive comes with the rising Islamist ideology: “The purpose of 
declaring a jihad against Ethiopia—a country that has a 45–50 percent Muslim 
population—is to provide religiously-indoctrinated Somalis the motivation to fight 
Ethiopian troops.”105 Also, Fuad Mohammed Kalaf, an ICU educational official, 
recognized the youth as the most potential fighters for their cause: “The students are seen 
as ideal for this role because they can be easily indoctrinated and are energetic 
followers.… There is nothing wrong with our plan to train students. There are a lot of 
countries in the world that carry out such exercises.”106  
E. FINANCIAL FACTORS 
Expanding its influence on the political, military and geographical factors of 
Somalia, the ICU also paid significant attention to its financial and economic resources. 
While other non-state actors depended on mainly outside support, ICU leaders managed 
to derive their sources of revenue from three main areas: The first is the local 
administration: In June 2006, ICU made a partially successful attempt to create a viable 
administration: “the most evident elements of this process include a partial removal of 
checkpoints in Mogadishu and the refurbishing of infrastructure of long-time unused key 
103 Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, 25. 
104 Ibid., 301. 
105 Sunguta West, “Somalia’s ICU Declares Holy War on Ethiopia,” Terrorism Focus 3, no. 40 
(2006), accessed May 12, 2014. 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=934%3E%20-%20.UyCYb86a-
SQ#.U2L47ldN18F. 
106 West, “Somalia’s ICU Declares Holy War on Ethiopia.”  
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public assets, such as the Mogadishu seaport and airport, and they have instituted a 
program of taxation.”107 In smaller cities, however, the ICU faced difficulties since local 
businesses were resistant to pay different fees from the ones they were already paying.  
The second area of incoming revenue is financial support from the business 
community—the ICU made strategic financial alliances with major leading businesses in 
Somalia that benefited both sides. From the ICU’s perspective, it was beneficial because 
it was not an improvisation, but a deliberate and well-planned/established cooperation. 
The business area also had advantages from the restoration of law; the reduction of 
checkpoints lowered the operational cost and an increased quantity needed to be 
imported. One UN observer team in Somalia concluded in their report: “At the moment, 
the ICU seems to have a broad mosaic of economic sectors headed by businessmen ready 
to provide the necessary financial support.”108  
The third area is the increasing contributions from inside Somalia and foreign 
countries: ICU’s attempt to create a more stable environment in 2006 generated much 
popular support. According to official reports from Somalia, ICU had better support than 
the acting temporary government:  
…the Islamic Courts received support from the population in areas it 
controlled.…the group had constituencies from multiple sub-clans and had 
broad support among Somali women.…people provided crucial support by 
feeding their forces and working with Islamic Courts officials in bringing 
peace and stability.109  
There have also been large amounts of individual contributions from inside of the 
country in different amounts ranging from several hundred thousand dollars to 
millions.110  
Outside support came from two different main areas. One was the wealthy Somali 
diaspora. They have either used the normal banking system and added an extra 5 or 10 
107 Al-Nasser, UN Monitoring Group Report on Somalia, 33. 
108 Ibid., 37. 
109 Dagne, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, 19. 
110 Al-Nasser, UN Monitoring Group Report on Somalia, 39. 
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percent of their regular remittance, or donated money via the Hawala system111 from 
Somali communities settled in mainly European countries. The other (and most likely the 
more significant) support arrived from those countries that supported ICU’s cause. Both 
waterborne and airborne support including arms, military materiel and even combat 
troops that frequently arrived from Iran, Saudi Arabia or Eritrea regardless of the trading 
embargo. 
In 2006, the ICU had much larger and better support than the acting temporary 
government. Nonetheless, with the external support of U.S. air power and the entire 
Ethiopian army, in a very short war TFG overthrew ICU in the southern and central part 
of Somalia, and basically forced ICU top leaders to flee the country. Shortly after the 
invasion, however, the rising insurgency still had enough resources to wage a guerrilla-
type war to drive the Ethiopian forces out of the country. From the financial perspective, 
ICU and its followers used both internal and external support in a very effective way.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The invasion and the insurgency afterwards reflected several aspects of an 
“irregular defense strategy.” ICU might have been aware of the overwhelming offensive 
forces, and did not show a willingness to wage a definite battle against the Ethiopians. 
After the initial conventional defeat, however, their strategy led them to a successful 
insurgency, and caused the withdrawal of the occupying forces. In their strategy, the 
obvious signs of irregular warfare were no front lines, avoiding decisive battles, and 
reliance on harassing attacks. The latter used more than the typical guerrilla tactics like 
suicide bombings and assassination, so one might say it was not a pure guerrilla fight. 
The geographic characteristics of the country are not dominant in the outcome of the 
main invasion and the insurgency, but the chief advantage that the urbanized area can 
give to a fighting group has been effectively used by the insurgents. The human 
111 “Hawala is an alternative remittance system. It exists and operates outside of, or parallel to 
‘traditional’ banking or financial channels....often referred to as ‘underground banking,’ this term is not 
always correct, as they often operate in the open with complete legitimacy, and these services are often 
heavily and effectively advertised...Hawala works by transferring money without actually moving it. In fact 
‘money transfer without money movement’...” Patrick M. Jost (FinCEN), Harjit Singh Sandhu (FOPAC), 
The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money Laundering (Lyon: Interpol General 
Secretariat, January 2000). 
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characteristics of ICU’s paramount manpower were appropriate in a fight consisting of 
those social factors of Somalia and the type of warfare that ICU conducted. The financial 
background was similar to other resistance groups, but it had greater emphasis on the 
internal business world.  
Overall, a properly implemented irregular defense strategy forced a numerically 
superior force to withdraw, so the dilemma arises again for defense planners: would it be 
worth considering this type of warfare in one’s own defense strategy? 
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VI. THE U.S. INVASION OF IRAQ IN 2003 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Iraq War (or the Second Persian Gulf War) had two major phases. The first 
one was a classical conventionally fought war by the Coalition forces. In this phase, the 
allied troops—predominantly U.S. forces—invaded the country and gained a quick 
victory over the Iraqi military forces that had shown only very weak resistance in most 
cases. Then, a much more painful and bloody phase occurred for both sides. The U.S.-led 
alliance was opposed by an insurgency.  
The prelude to war: After the Taliban regime had been overthrown (and, hence, 
al-Qaeda’s main supporting platform destroyed), President Bush could focus on other 
targets of the war on terrorism. The U.S. intelligence system reported that the main 
danger originated from Iraq. Saddam was a great threat to peace in the Middle East. He 
had tried to acquire the capability to build nuclear weapons; this had never been 
implemented, however. He used chemical weapons against Iran and his own Kurds in the 
late 1980s. He had supported the assassination attempt against President George H. W. 
Bush.112 He harshly suppressed the uprising of the Kurds and Shi’a. The UN discovered a 
variety of prohibited armament systems and technology throughout the country. Even 
after the bombing of some military installations in 1998, Iraq refused to allow UN 
inspectors to reenter the country, a move that irritated the international community.113  
The Bush administration strongly but wrongly believed that Iraq was providing 
safe haven for different terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda (the perpetrators of the 9/11 
attack). Even though his association with al-Qaeda has never been proved—Saddam was 
an Arab secularist, bin Laden was a Salafist (“a believer in a Muslim world without 
political institutions”)114—this did not stop the U.S. As John Keegan writes: 
“Unfortunately for Saddam, official America after 9/11 was uninterested in distinctions 
112 John Keegan, The Iraq War, 1st American ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 99. 
113 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “Iraq War,” accessed May 2, 2014, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/870845/Iraq-War. 
114 Keegan, The Iraq War, 99. 
 53 
                                                 
between one sort of Arab extremist and another. Osama was violently anti-American. So 
was Saddam. The decision was taken to eliminate his régime.”115 Despite the objection of 
some other world leaders, President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair ended the diplomacy and gave an ultimatum to Saddam to leave Iraq.  
Since Saddam refused to leave his country, the invasion began in March 2003. It 
started with precision-guided bombings against military and government installations. 
The ground incursion took only days for U.S. forces to invade the country from Kuwait, 
with the greatest resistance from irregular groups of Baath Party supporters (also called 
Saddam’s Fedayeen).116 The northern part of Iraq showed similarly low resistance. Even 
though the Turkish government did not allow U.S. forces to invade Iraq from their 
territory, the combined force of U.S. Special Forces, paratroopers and Kurdish fighters 
had only minor difficulties in seizing the northern cities. The central area fell since the 
disorganized Iraqi Republican Guard—responsible for defending the capital—could not 
resist the raids by U.S. Marine Corps units. Nevertheless, some groups loyal to the 
regime continued fighting, but President Bush declared an end to the main war on May 1. 
The outbreak of irregular warfare (the second phase), however, prevented peace 
in Iraq. In their study group report, James A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton summarized the 
greatest challenges the allied forces faced: “The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence 
is increasing in scope and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militias 
and death squads, Al-Qaeda, and widespread criminality. Sectarian conflict is the 
principal challenge to stability.”117 Saddam eventually anticipated his defeat but hoped 
that the U.S. war aims were limited and it would not overthrow his regime. He thought 
there would be a disciplinary air campaign and an attempt to seize the northern oil fields. 
Saddam’s intent was to build a conventional force supported by irregular forces to oppose 
the ground threat. In preparation, he distributed weapons to his regime’s supporters, 
stocked armaments in schools, mosques, and hospitals, and let foreign fighters into the 
115 Keegan, The Iraq War, 100. 
116 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “Iraq War.”  
117 James A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage Books, 
2006), xiii. 
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country with official encouragement. It is hard to prove that Saddam was planning to 
conduct a postwar resistance, but for sure his prewar preparations helped the emergence 
of the insurgency.118  
The most difficult task for the occupying forces might have been to restore law 
and order, especially when their effort was exacerbated by frequent attacks that soon 
reflected the full spectrum of guerrilla warfare. The Bush administration did not like this 
term and they preferred to use “sectarian violence.”119 The brutal killings by the two 
main rival Shi’a and Sunni militias inflicted massive chaos on the country for several 
years. Beyond those two principal forces, other factions such as al-Qaeda in Iraq and 
various Shi’a and Sunni groups added to the destabilization. 
1. The Sunni Insurgency  
The overthrow of the former regime, as well as the general breakdown in order, 
left a power vacuum in the country that provided a promising condition to different 
insurgent groups to try to gain control of the country. The Sunni Arabs commenced their 
movement about three months after the invasion, and proved to be a “…thinking, 
adaptive, and even growing force against the Coalition forces and the Shi’a-led 
government.”120 Its three main motives were resistance to occupation, overthrow of the 
new government, and establishment of an Islamic state.121 From an organizational 
perspective the Sunni Arabs were similar to contemporary terrorist groups. They were 
organized into a “web of networks” and mostly linked by personal, tribal or 
organizational ties. Also, their financial support came through the ‘classical’ chain: 
“former regime financial network, traditional hawala networks, and charitable religious 
endowments.”122  
118 Mansoor Moaddel, Mark Tessler, and Ronald Inglehart, “Saddam Hussein and the Sunni 
Insurgency: Findings from Values Surveys,” Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 4 (Winter, 2008), 623–
644, 2. 
119 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “Iraq War.”  
120 Moaddel, Tessler, and Inglehart, “Saddam Hussein and the Sunni Insurgency,” 623–644, 624. 
121 Ibid., ix. 
122 Ibid., x. 
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At tactical and operational levels, the Sunnis could maintain a high level of 
activity despite the Coalition’s counterinsurgent activities and resulting significant 
personnel losses for the insurgents. The IED operations were frequently coupled with 
complex attacks exacting an increasing toll on the Coalition forces as well as the Iraqi 
civilians. More importantly, they achieved vital strategic objectives, as has been assessed 
by Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White: (1) establishing themselves as a social and 
political force; (2) gaining popularity by attacking Coalition forces; (3) deterring any pro-
government segments of the population; (4) creating a complicated political transition by 
boycotting the elections in 2005; and (5) influencing the dissatisfaction of the U.S. 
population regarding how the war was handled, and hence the likely decision of 
withdrawal.123  
The Sunni Insurgency’s main strengths were its financial independence; given 
that they received a large amount of external support, they also had access to all kinds of 
internal support. Their network-based organization made them very flexible and 
adaptive. The organization had a certain amount of political presence. Very importantly, 
they were aware of the constraints of the Coalition forces in using force against the 
insurgents. Their weaknesses, however, significantly reduced their potential whenever 
those weaknesses were exploited by the counterinsurgent campaign or the Iraqi 
government. Many Sunnis had ambivalent feelings about the insurgency. The movement 
did not have a unified leadership, so it could not really formulate a steady political 
strategy, further limiting its popularity. Probably one of its weakest points was the 
extreme beliefs of its member and the brutality with which they implemented their 
actions, alienating many allies and Sunnis.124  
Even though the Sunni Arab insurgents are a tough opponent, they are not 
undefeatable; the fight against them, however, is definitely costly and protracted, and it is 
even harder for the Coalition forces and the Iraqi government when these extremists are 
not alone. 
123 Moaddel, Tessler, and Inglehart, “Saddam Hussein and the Sunni Insurgency,” 623–644, xi. 
124 Ibid. 
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2. Al-Qaeda in Iraq  
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had been officially formed in 2004 when Abu Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi linked his militant group with al-Qaeda. The organization consisted of radical 
Sunni militias and had a slightly different ideology than al-Qaeda: “Zarqawi was 
sometimes critical of al‐Qa’ida’s willingness to cooperate with “apostates” against other 
enemies and, unlike Bin Laden, fervently argued that al‐Qa’ida’s “Near Enemy”—
apostates and the Shi’a—were more dangerous than its “Far Enemy”—the United States 
and the West.”125 Zarqawi wanted to launch a sectarian war in order to prevent the Shi’a 
movement from controlling Iraq, and also to maintain instability and thus push the 
Coalition forces out of the country.  
At the beginning of its struggle, AQI targeted Shi’as, Coalition forces and the 
Iraqi government, but in the later phases in 2009 it seemed to change strategy and 
members’ objectives were primarily government and Coalition officials. They also began 
to vie with other Sunni militants for being the dominant leader of the insurgency, so in 
their target package other Sunni groups could be found, as well. Their long-term goal 
remained: “Establishing a fundamentalist Muslim state in Iraq as a precursor to ensuring 
the return of the Islamic caliphate.”126 
The group zealously used suicide bombings and IED as their main tactical method 
to destroy targets. Also, they demonstrated extreme brutality, using chlorine gas with 
conventional explosives. These ruthless tactics, the bombings of three hotels in Amman, 
the large number of Shi’a killed, and the large number of the destroyed Shi’ite religious 
sites resulted in a disagreement by al-Qaeda leadership, and also alienated potential 
supporters. Al-Qaeda leadership strongly opposed AQI strategy, since it would be 
extremely hard to be politically dominant after the U.S. withdrawal if Muslims were still 
being killed. 
125 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qaeda’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq (West Point: Combating 
Terrorism Center, 2007), 4. 
126 Stanford University, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq,” accessed May 2, 2014, 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1#note5. 
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Another vulnerability of the organization was the large number of foreign fighters 
and leaders in it. This originated from the large-scale support from foreign countries. 
Syria supported AQI with fighters and weapons, but they received support from several 
other countries as well (Saudi Arabians, Libyans, and Algerians, to mention only the 
largest contributors).127 After the death of Zarqawi in 2006, his successor al-Masri 
declared the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in order to give a more Iraqi image to AQI and 
“… to unify resistance to U.S. occupation, inspire support from al‐Qa’ida’s global 
supporters by imposing Islamic law, and ensure that al‐Qa’ida was prepared in case of a 
precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.”128  
ISI faltered from the start since there was no significant proof to the Iraqis that the 
organization was indigenous, rather than led or particularly influenced by foreign actors. 
Consequently, one of the definitive strategic challenges of al-Qaeda in Iraq was to 
promote their ideology to relatively secular Iraqis. Also, AQI was severely damaged by 
the “outpost network” strategy pursued from 2007 to 2008 and by the social network 
building of the “Awakening” movement. Nowadays, AQI lacks significant political 
power, but militarily still remains one of the dominant insurgent groups, and keeps the 
country destabilized. The situation in Iraq reflects the symptoms—outbursts of violence, 
jihadist groups acting without control—of another insurgency, especially since the 
Coalition forces left the country.   
The following sections of this chapter will analyze the Mahdi Army—also known 
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and led by Muqtada al-Sadr—in more detail. Despite the fact that 
it was not the most influential insurgent group from 2003, it still played a significant role 
in the insurrection and became a dominant political force.  
  
127 Stanford University, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq.”  
128 Felter and Fishman, Al-Qaeda`s Foreign Fighters in Iraq, 5. 
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B. STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
It is easy to summarize Muqtada al-Sadr’s strategy in a few words: violent 
movement against the invader—gaining popular support—involvement in politics. It 
looks like a classic example of waging a guerrilla war from its beginning to the end like 
the one by Che and Castro in Cuba, or Hezbollah against Israel; it was not that simple in 
real life, however.  
Violent movement: Right after the U.S. and its alliance had overthrown Saddam’s 
regime, Sadr sought to fill the position the Ba’athist system left behind. He condemned 
the U.S. occupation and its proposed interim government. Sadr’s army consisted of 
several thousand fighters mainly recruited from young impoverished Shi’ites from and 
around Baghdad. Their ability to apply asymmetric warfare was bounded, but still very 
effective:  
Both the Mahdi Army and the—special groups have shown they have 
elements skilled in the tactics of asymmetrical warfare. Most of their 
successes come through the use of indirect fire and extremely primitive 
yet effective explosives. JAM and—special groups have proven more than 
capable against both U.S. and ISF forces when fighting head-on. However, 
of greater importance is their ability to stop fighting, via ceasefires or 
clandestine retreats in order to prevent eradication. Even more impressive 
is their ability to end fighting without ever having to give up their 
weapons.129 
Throughout his struggle, Sadr fought several bloody battles, not only against the 
invaders but against Iraqi security forces and other Shi’ite rival parties. During these 
fights, the Mahdi Army’s actions included even more asymmetric tactics: “Ṣadr’s critics 
held JAM responsible for brutal acts of retribution against Sunnis, including kidnapping, 
killing, torture, and the destruction of mosques and property.”130 As a major part of his 
tactical maneuvers when the pressure on him and his militia increased, he simply ordered 
a freeze on all military activities in order to reorganize. Once, he even left Iraq to Iran—
likely to escape from the increasing pressure and in an attempt to regain credibility.  
129 Anthony H. Cordesman and Jose Ramos, Sadr and the Mahdi Army (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, [2008]), 17. 
130 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s. v., “Muqtada Al-Sadr” accessed May 2, 2014, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1008510/Muqtada-al-Sadr. 
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Gaining popular support: Most of the Shi’ites looked at Sadr as a hero because he 
used his militia not only for fighting against the invaders, but for protecting the majority 
of his own people against the Sunni insurgents. Also, he provided the population valuable 
public service when he “had attracted millions of Shi’ite followers across Iraq…to whom 
he offered a variety of social, educational, and health services. He also maintained tight 
security over the areas he controlled and established a court system based on Shari’ah 
(Islamic law).”131 
Involvement in politics: At the very beginning of his struggle, Sadr realized that 
he needed to focus on the political realm of Iraq since his violence movement alone 
would not accomplish his goals. In order to have another pillar in his strategy, similar to 
the “Hezbollah-model,” he ordered his militia to be greatly engaged in social work that 
won 32 parliamentary seats in the 2005 national elections.132 Sadr gave definitive support 
for pushing Nouri al-Maliki to the position of prime minister, and this was not the only 
focus of his political involvement. He extended his interest in other social ministries (e.g., 
health, transportation, and municipal government) as well.  
The pressure on him, however, increased both internally and externally. More and 
more areas of his military activity were targeted, which increased the need for a ceasefire. 
Also, Mahdi fighters opposed his embrace of the national political system. He was still 
able to maneuver this with a great strategic decision: “Al-Sadr stated that he was dividing 
his Mahdi Army into two distinct wings. The largest wing would be made up from most 
of his followers. This group was designed to act as the political and social services wing. 
The smaller group would be turned into new special companies of elite experienced 
fighters tasked with resisting the occupation.”133 This and the continuous government 
pressure had led to the dissolution of the Mahdi Army itself. Nevertheless, Sadr’s 
involvement in politics remained definitive even after his final withdrawal in February 
2014.  
131 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s. v., “Muqtada Al-Sadr” 
132 Greg Bruno, “Muqtada Al-Sadr,” accessed May 2, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/muqtada-al-
sadr/p7637. 
133 Cordesman and Ramos, Sadr and the Mahdi Army, 3. 
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C. GEOGRAPHY 
Iraq’s geography consists of four main regions: the desert in the west and 
southwest, the mountainous upland between the upper Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, the 
highlands in the north and northeast, and the sandy plain through which the Tigris and 
Euphrates flow. The most dominant geographic feature in the conflict—in the invasion 
itself and the insurgency that followed—was the desert. In the age of scientific military 
developments, this ancient hazard continues to pose challenges—but also gives good 
opportunities. 
The flat, featureless terrain gave more advantage to the technologically more 
advanced and armor-protected allied force, since their pace was much more rapid in their 
advance. Also, in clear visibility the Coalition forces had covered larger distances with 
their high-tech optics; neither of the opposing forces, however, had a good chance to use 
the terrain for cover and concealment. Also, ground target acquisition is quite difficult for 
both parties in a situation of low visibility, creating a constant risk of friendly fire. For 
this reason the main incidents outside the urban areas happened in the near vicinity of the 
highways or the improved road network.  
Not only did IEDs and roadside bombs cause serious headaches for allied 
convoys, but the extremely fine dust caused mechanical breakdowns for many vehicles 
during convoy operations that basically concluded the majority of the operation, since a 
huge occupying force needed to be re-supplied. The engines got overheated during the 
particularly hot days, and the tires got softer, flatter, and less durable from the heat of the 
road surface.  
Desert weather is variable and causes trouble for everyone, as evidenced by those 
sand storms that turned Operation Eagle Claw into a catastrophe on the ground in 1980 
during the Iranian hostage crisis, and limited the aerial advantage in general. For the 
occupying forces, these extreme climate and geographic conditions made the war even 
more expensive in terms of water, food and its storage, transport, maintenance, etc. The 
cost for the insurgency was not as prohibitive, since they had the knowledge of how to 
live off the land and their technology required much less maintenance.  
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The unevenly dispersed population is probably the most important to a military 
campaign, where the media is basically glued to the combat troops and civilian casualties 
need to be avoided more than ever. At least, it is much more considered nowadays than it 
was in ancient wars. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers basically define the majority of the 
inhabited Iraq, and the center of it is Baghdad, where nearly 20 percent of the Iraqis 
live.134 From the insurgents’ perspective it was a great chance to use it with all of its 
advantages, and from the invaders’ perspective it was probably the hardest thing during 
the occupation, as it is neatly summarized by Brian Handwerk from National 
Geographic: “Simple human density makes avoiding civilian casualties difficult, and 
affords cover, security, and perhaps even anonymity for those who would take advantage 
of urban geography.”135 It is certainly contradictory to the discipline of the Mahdi Army, 
because al-Sadr clearly announced in his statement: “Absolutely avoid military actions in 
cities.”136 
Regardless of the technologically far advanced occupation forces, the Iraqi 
geography had a major impact on the war. First, it made the invasion and the “after war” 
period more costly for them; second, the population pattern pushed the operational focus 
into the urbanized area that definitely supported the insurgents more than the alliance. 
D. HUMAN FACTORS 
During the struggle against the Coalition, the movement was subdued 
technologically, financially and—considering the numbers of fighters—human resources. 
Nevertheless, some human characteristics helped the extremist movement to stay 
balanced and caused so much trouble for the occupiers. The main features that made 
these fighters a potentially dangerous opponent were their religious-based inspiration, 
territorial and national integrity, capability to adapt, and improvisation, as well as the 
fact that most of them were young with a demand to seek status for their adulthood.  
134 Brian Handwerk, “Geography Shapes Nature of War in Iraq,” accessed May 2, 2014, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/03/0327_030327_wargeography.html. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Cordesman and Ramos, Sadr and the Mahdi Army, 25. 
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Religious inspiration: Despite his father’s pedigree, in his childhood Sadr never 
studied in any religious institution; his overall strategy, however, flaunts religious 
credentials in order to maintain the devotion of his supporters. He encouraged his 
followers to attend more and more religious activities, and announced that he would 
attend a seminary in Najaf.137 Babak Rahimi, a Shi’ite expert, wrote: “Sadr’s religious 
move indicate a major change in the movement’s structure that could have serious 
repercussions for the future of Iraq.”138 Rahimi also added that Sadr’s inspiration may 
also be to “reinforce his Iraqi identity.”139 
Territorial integrity has its origins in the 1920s when the post-WWI British 
occupation forces created modern Iraq. Since then, the Shi’ite dream has been only 
nourished to rule and control the central and northern parts of Iraq, where the substantial 
revenue from the oil wells can be owned. National identity is also tied to this era, when 
the power struggle between the Sunnis and the Shi’ites occurred. Despite their similarity 
in the ethnic and cultural fields, the political territory had two different directions: 
“Whereas the Sunni ruling elite adopted a wider Arab nationalism as its main ideology, 
the Shi’as have preferred Iraqi nationalism, which stresses the distinct values and heritage 
of Iraqi society.”140 The overall opposition to the U.S. can be traced back to their 
territorial and national integrity as well: 
They abhor the idea of an Iraqi government installed by the United States 
to further America’s interests…In spite of repeated assurances by the Bush 
administration that Iraq’s oil belongs to its people, the Shi’as still seem 
worried that the United States is essentially seeking to dominate the oil 
resources of their country.141  
One can consider the Mahdi Army an extremely young organization from more 
perspectives. One is the relative young age of its members. It gives the feeling that these 
137 Bruno, Muqtada Al-Sadr. 








                                                 
youth can be successful against a much more powerful enemy. Similar to other guerrilla 
organizations or resistance movements, these young people are motivated to seek status 
for their adulthood and trying to defeat “Goliath.”  
Improvisation and ability to adapt: Even though the organization still did not 
possess practical combat experience, it was fairly effective in using asymmetrical warfare 
in a number of clashes against the U.S. and its allies, and they could remain the most 
prominent and most risky Shi’a militia in Iraq: “Their ability to adapt to military tactics 
and technological advancements has put further stress on the U.S. military both 
financially and mentally, and their ability to develop and/or employ devastating weapon 
systems has been a serious problem.”142  
E. FINANCIAL FACTORS 
Despite its popular support, Sadr’s financial support remains inconsistent, but 
somehow classical and based on two main directions. One of them is the internally 
produced revenue and the other one is the external stream of income. Within its area of 
control, the Mahdi Army produced money more like terrorist groups, rather than the more 
popular guerrilla organizations, such as Hezbollah: “Cash is believed to be generated 
from a number of criminal enterprises, including petroleum smuggling, theft, and cash-
for-services—including armed protection of merchants and businesses.”143  
Another way to gain money was not the purest technique, but it worked pretty 
much effectively for the organization. First, it offered some extremely-needed services, 
for example generators, but in this country—as part of the public services—the electricity 
runs only few hours a day, so those generators that are provided by the JAM would have 
a popular impact. JAM has often provided power generators at high rates and tried to 
block the central government from providing other services by threatening the 
contractors. A prominent international study gives a short summary how they had 
gathered a large part of their proceeds: “Using mafia-like tactics have allowed the JAM to 
become involved—at all levels of the local economy, taking money from gas stations, 
142 Cordesman and Ramos, Sadr and the Mahdi Army, 15. 
143 Bruno, Muqtada Al-Sadr. 
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private minibus services, electric switching stations, food and clothing markets, ice 
factories, and even collecting rent from squatters. The JAM was able to control parts of 
their operation through exploitation and threats.”144  
The other significant backing was from external support. The Mahdi Army and its 
allied extremist groups were properly equipped to resist, and this equipment and material 
support mainly arrived from their Iranian sponsors. Iran provided basically the full 
spectrum of “guerrilla-type equipment,” ranging from man-portable rockets to ready-to-
use Explosively Formed Projectile/Penetrators (EFP) that were able to penetrate even the 
thickest armor. The Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard basically wanted to 
repeat their successful sponsorship with Hezbollah, and create another state-within a-state 
organization in order to effectively fight for their cause: “In late 2011, representatives of 
Asaib Ahl al-Haq attended a conference at a four-star hotel in Beirut with Hezbollah, 
Hamas, and other members of the ‘axis of resistance’ to plot strategy against the Little 
Satan (Israel) and the Great Satan (the United States).”145 In addition to its material 
funding, Iran also provided religious support by sending students and scholars to the 
larger “strategic” important cities of the Sadrist movement. Also, the economic 
reconstruction of Iraq plays a definitive role in Iran’s foreign policy that opens beneficial 
opportunities for the extremist groups. The social support included giving extreme Shi’ite 
parties a safe home base during the supremacy of Baath Parties.146  
Similar to Hezbollah and the Somali Islamic Courts Union, the Mahdi Army used 
mainly small arms that were cheap and cheaply maintained. The dominant weapon 
system of the Shi’ite armed groups was the AK-family, specifically the AK-47. Also, the 
“very light” infantry basic weapons were popular, such as grenades, RPGs, sniper rifles, 
and machine guns. The heavier weapons—IEDs, Explosively Formed Projectile, 
Improvised Rocket Assisted Mortar, even BM-21 rockets—caused most of the civilian 
and military casualties.  
144 Cordesman and Ramos, Sadr and the Mahdi Army, 3. 
145 Boot, “Iraq: Baghdad without America.” 
146 Lionel Beehner and Greg Bruno, “Iran’s Involvement in Iraq,” accessed May 2, 2014, 
http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-involvement-iraq/p12521. 
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An important financial consideration in this Iraqi case is the occupiers’ high cost. 
The insurgents could use these weapon systems very effectively, and embedded this 
capability into a well-conceived strategy that made the defense against them even more 
difficult and expensive: “The use of these weapons has given the JAM a political impact 
much larger than its military impact.…special groups have been able to use such weapons 
and limited resources in attacks on Coalition forces that have been expensive in lives, 
cost billions of dollars, and have had a major impact on U.S. domestic politics.”147  
F. CONCLUSION 
The strategic idea of Sadr’s resistance movement is probably best described by 
al-Sadr himself in an interview on a news channel: “The Sadrist movement first resorted 
to peaceful resistance, then to armed resistance, and finally to political resistance.”148 
That can basically be a classical example of a guerrilla movement. The geographical 
conditions did not provide extraordinary advantage or disadvantage to either side, but two 
major features certainly had a major impact on the entire invasion and the prolonged 
resistance. One is the population pattern that influenced the concept of operations from 
the alliance perspective, and undoubtedly helped the insurgents. Second is the climate 
that raised the expenditures of the invading forces. Similar to Hezbollah, the human 
characteristics of the Mahdi Army’s manpower fit seamlessly into a fight consisting of 
those environmental factors of Iraq and the type of warfare that al-Sadr conducted. 
Additionally, in this war the national identity just increased the enthusiasm of the 
insurgent fighters. Financially, it is apparent that, from the insurgents’ point of view, it 
cost far less to resist to an occupying force than it cost the occupying force to try to build 
and establish a new state and order, especially given the prolonged timeframe from 2003 
to 2011. 
Overall, even though al-Sadr’s political aspirations and his Mahdi Army were not 
the only fighting power against the occupation, surely his was the most dominant overall 
force, when one includes political strength within the total Iraqi resistance movements. 
147 Cordesman and Ramos, Sadr and the Mahdi Army, 16. 
148 Bruno, Muqtada Al-Sadr. 
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No one can claim a definitive victory over the occupiers, but similarly to other guerrilla-
type movements in history, al-Sadr’s irregular way of waging his war significantly helped 
to drive the occupying forces out of his country. Now, they may be involved in an 
irregular war against the Sunnis—the outcome of which hangs in the balance. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
According to the existing literature, irregular warfare can and should be seen as a 
robust warfighting method. To support this idea, one can see in today’s more than 30 
conflicts that none are fought in a clear conventional way. Why has IW became so 
“popular”? Why does at least one of the opposing forces involve civilian populations and 
urbanized terrain in its fight rather than moving to large, open, uninhabited plains and 
doing their business there, hurting fewer civilians and causing less collateral damage? 
The best approach to answering these questions could be to take a quick look at the 
opponents in the wars or conflicts of recent decades. From military, technological, 
financial and human resource perspectives, one side has been significantly more powerful 
(stronger) than the other (weaker).  
Obviously, if the weaker side wants to be successful it has to choose a method 
that could overcome the disadvantages of being outnumbered and out powered. The four 
main general options were not always affordable or advantageous (alliance, conventional 
army, WMD, or neutrality) for the weaker side, especially in the age of the rapid advance 
of technological development. So, the leadership had to choose a strategy that, if coupled 
with the given geographical environment, is more likely to achieve an effective conduct 
of the fight. There is no specifically developed irregular strategy, but principles that are 
applied in irregular warfare within specific conditions, as is observed by von der Heydte: 
“Strategy of irregular warfare is nothing but the application of generally valid maxims of 
a strategy of war under the special circumstances of an irregular war.”149 These valid 
maxims need to be used in a way to suit those specific conditions that were identified by 
Clausewitz and other renowned scholars from earlier ages in order to successfully wage 
an irregular war: geography, material character, morale, and the strategic defensive with a 
tactical offensive.150 Based on the facts that were found during this research, the likely 
ideal geographic conditions are when the terrain provides good cover and concealment, 
the climate does not affect the logistic (maintenance, storage) and human existence, the 
149 Von der Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, in Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon, 69. 
150 Gann, Guerrillas in History, 22–23. 
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population is dispersed and rural, but it also has some larger cities, and at least one of the 
bordering countries is supportive. These characteristics were used effectively by 
Hezbollah during its struggle against the Israelis in 2006. Understandably, when this 
“ideal” posture is not available, the irregularly fighting side will adopt and wage its war 
accordingly, as happened in Iraq and Somalia where most of the battles were in the 
urbanized area or the near vicinity of it, using probably the most advantageous tactical 
considerations and intermingling with the population.  
Considering Clausewitz’s second condition, the material character is an extremely 
important fact, especially from the weaker side’s perspective, that an irregularly waged 
conflict is much cheaper than a conventional one. Irregulars have rarely used heavy 
weapon systems (if ever); their logistic requirements needed far less budget than the 
regular armaments (including Navy, Army, Air Force) and the conventionally garrisoned 
troops. They also mostly lived off the land, and most of the time was not well paid but 
fought by motivation, like Hezbollah fighters had done for the first couple of years of 
their “beginners” period. A large part of the necessary resupply system can be pre-
positioned prior to the war, such as Saddam Hussein did during his prewar preparation or 
Hezbollah put out clandestine storages in a hidden bunker system. A noteworthy financial 
factor is that using light weapon systems and maneuvering to rural areas to fight (like 
Hezbollah) would reduce the collateral damage, so after the conflict in case of “victory” 
for the irregular side the reconstruction would cost significantly less. 
The next condition that this paper focused on was the human factor. More 
specifically, the research was conducted to identify those human characteristics that make 
a person a good guerrilla fighter. Most likely the one on the top of this list would be the 
level of motivation that can be based on religion, or territorial and national integrity. 
Another important factor is the affiliation of origin. A “spoiled westerner” elite soldier 
will probably never be able to compete with those that grew up in rough conditions. If 
someone is planning to wage an irregular warfare against a superior power, a prolonged 
war needs to be considered. The ones who have fought for their food and existence since 
childhood tend to have more patience, endurance, and adaptability for the long term, 
especially when they fight in their homeland. Last, the youth in all resistance movements 
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play a dominant factor due to their “desperado” mentality and the extreme will to seek 
recognition as adults. 
Finally, the most important factor is that the previously mentioned conditions 
need to merge into a strategy. Even though there is no specifically designed irregular 
doctrine or strategy, Mao Tse Tung noted that guerrillas need a strategy. Hezbollah used 
a new “transitional” way of fighting that consisted of conventional and irregular features 
as well, but this unique strategy worked. In Iraq, a more classical way of irregular warfare 
was dominant (at least by Muqtada Al-Sadr): a peaceful movement, followed by an 
armed resistance, then a political resistance against the acting government. In Somalia, 
the strategy was based on a more battle-ready movement after the invasion and the 
attrition of the TGF since the occupiers had no clear plan regarding security. In all cases, 
the weaker side had its own way and a well-thought-out plan to cause enough loss and 
trouble for the occupying forces to make them withdraw.  
However, one cannot simply copy those strategies and build his own defense on 
them. Even if all these conditions are available, the implementation of an irregular 
defense policy would raise some dilemmas for governance. Would it work for every 
weaker country? Who should be taught to fight irregularly, the entire population or only 
the “professionals”? What would be a proper proportion of the combination of irregular 
defense forces and conventional forces in case there is no consensus between the 
different stakeholders to stand a pure professional irregular defense strategy? 
The analyses of these case studies showed that the applied strategies were 
effective enough to be considered as potential pillars of a state defense policy. Further 
research also identified several facts that support the idea that under certain 
circumstances a professional irregular defense strategy can be less costly for a small 
country than any of the four general alternative choices. Furthermore, based on the case 
studies and the wider conceptual research of this topic, it is likely acceptable that when a 
beneficial use of the geographical environment and the availability of the “appropriate” 
human characteristics couple with a doctrine based on irregular warfare, it is more 
possible to achieve an effective defense.  
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